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1. INTRODUCTION
The development of Japan's capital markets, and the correspond-
ing concerns regarding the current state of regulation of Japanese in-
vestment banking and securities trading practices, has attracted a good
deal of attention over the last few years, particularly since the size of
Japan's domestic capital markets has eclipsed the size of many of its
counterparts around the world. One phenomenon that appears to have
gone largely unnoticed is the unique contribution made by the monu-
mental privatization efforts undertaken by the Japanese government
during the last decade, resulting in the listing of shares of one of the
world's largest corporations, as well as the expansion of participation in
the securities markets to large numbers of new individual investors and
the creation of troublesome conflicts of interest among the nation's leg-
islators, investment bankers and regulators.
This article examines the impact of the privatization and deregula-
tion of certain Japanese public enterprises on the Japanese securities
markets. Part 2 provides a brief summary of the rationale for the public
enterprise in Japan and the pressure which led to the privatization pol-
icies adopted by the government in the early 1980's. Part 3 examines
the process of privatization and deregulation in Japan's telecommunica-
tions sector in order to discover the groups that have strong vested in-
terests in national telecommunications policies and the effect these in-
terests might have upon trading activity in the securities of Japan's
largest telecommunication enterprise. Part 4 describes parallel priva-
tization activities in the airway, railway and tobacco areas. Finally,
Parts 5 and 6 provide an analysis of the effects that privatization has
had on the development of the Japanese securities markets and invest-
ment banking industry.
* Mr. Gutterman is Counsel to the international law firm of Pettit & Martin,
resident in its San Francisco office. He is the Co-Chair of the Asia-Pacific Law Com-
mittee of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice and the Subcommittee on
Emerging Capital Markets in Developing Countries of the Committee on International
Investment and Development of that Section. He has published articles on developmen-
tal policies in Japan and on the impact of Japan's fiscal policies after World War II.
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2. JAPANESE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
2.1. Background
In almost every country, there exists one or more sets of goods and
services which are considered to be essential to the economic and social
welfare of the public. It is in these key areas where government regula-
tion of some type is most visible, particularly as the state attempts to
control various aspects of the activity, including entry into and exit
from the activity in question, compensation and pricing, the quality and
scope of services, mergers and combinations within the industry and
financing, in order to ensure the efficient allocation of resources and
timely delivery of needed goods and services.' Moreover, in industries
such as public utilities, postal services, telecommunications and rail-
ways,' government involvement may extend beyond mere regulation to
the creation of government managed, owned or sanctioned enterprises
to provide the specified goods and services.'
In contrast to the United States, where the government has gener-
ally limited its intervention into certain public services to regulating the
activities of and granting monopolies or exclusive areas of operation to
privately capitalized firms, Japan has a long history of utilizing public
enterprises to carry out government functions of a social and economic
nature, beginning with the government's ventures in the textile, steel
and shipping industries after the Meiji Restoration in 1868." Following
I Uekusa, Government Regulations in Japan: Toward Their International Har-
monization and Integration in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT
CHANGE? 237, 242 (1990). For an outline of economic regulation in Japan at the end
of 1989, see id. at 244-45. The outline identifies disparate types of regulation with
respect to entry (i.e., permission, licensing, registration, notification or a legal monop-
oly) and pricing (i.e., authorization, notification, guidance or legal sanction by the Diet,
Japan's national legislature).
2 Each of these industries has the characteristics of a natural monopoly in terms of
the economics of scale available at the production stage, the economic efficiency of their
distribution networks, the scale of the sunk costs of both production and/or distribu-
tion, and their utilization of scarce resources. governmental regulations at once sanction
such supply-side monopolies (or highly concentrated oligopolies), be they at the na-
tional or local level, but at the same time attempt to circumscribe the ways they use
their power to dominate their respective markets. Id. at 242-43. There are other regu-
lated industries in countries like Japan, such as tobacco manufacturing and sales,
where the government's primary objective is to ensure an adequate level of tax reve-
nues. Id. at 243.
' In Japan, these "public enterprises" are of three broad types: (1) governmental
undertakings that are operated within the central or local government; (2) public corpo-
rations, which operate independently, yet are wholly-owned by the national government
(the "government") and regulated by the Diet; and (3) mixed enterprises, which take
the form of limited companies and are regulated by the appropriate government minis-
try. Id. at 246.
4 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN at 37 (Kiyoaki Tsuji ed. 1984).
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the end of World War II, Japan established a number of independent
public organizations, including large public corporations such as
the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation ("NTT"),5
the Japan National Railways ("JNR")6 and the Japan Tobacco and
Salt Public Corp. ('5JTS"), 7 financial organizations which were to
provide assistance for imports, exports and overall industrial develop-
ment,' and "special companies" such as the Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd.
5 NTT was founded in 1952 as a wholly owned government company and was
originally modeled after the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"), includ-
ing a research laboratory. However, NTT was precluded from manufacturing telecom-
munications equipment. JAPANESE ECONOMIC INSTrrUTE REPORT No. 32A at 2
(1990) (hereinafter JEI REPORT No. 32A).
6 The JNR was originally formed in 1872 as part of the country's late 19th Cen-
tury modernization efforts. The postwar national railway company arose from a reor-
ganization of a branch of the Ministry of Transportation ("MOT") in 1949. Id. at 1-2.
7 JTS was founded in 1949 by merging two government monopolies. Id. at 2.
NTT, JNR and JTS were referred to as "Kosha." "These businesses were once di-
rectly run by the national government and financed by specibl accounts [in the national
budget. After World War II,] they were established as independent organizations to
perform their business in the form of private concerns. They are fully financed by the
government; their budget is subject to the approval of the Diet and final accounts also
had to be submitted to the Diet. The employees are granted the right of collective
bargaining but [unlike employees of other public corporations,] not the right to strike."
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra note 4, at 38. As of January 1982, Kosha
had 780,056 of the then-current total of 930,470 public corporation employees. Id. at
46.
* These organizations included the Koko, Ginko and Kinko..
Koko [, such as the Housing Loan Corporation,] are financial corporations
which supplement the operation of commercial finance institutions by fi-
nancing special projects such as agriculture, forest and fishing industries,
small and medium-sized enterprises, and housing construction at a policy-
oriented rate of interest. They are fully financed by [capital and loans
from the government.] The budget and final accounts of Koko were subject
to the approval of the Diet, as in the case of Kosha.
Ginko [, such as the Japan Development Bank and the Export-Import
Bank of Japan,] have much in common with Koko: (i) they played a sup-
plementary role to commercial financial institutions, (ii) their capital is
fully financed by the national government, and (iii) their budgets and final
accounts are under the control of the Diet. However, they enjoyed more
autonomy and operate more as enterprises than Koko in that business
plans and operational procedures can be prepared without the approval of
the competent ministers and internal reserves such as legal reserves are
permitted.
Kinko [, such as the Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and For-
estry and the Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Cooperatives,]
are corporations set up for the purpose of financing cooperatives. Both
issue bonds to be used as sources for loans [and maintain strong auton-
omy in operations due to the fact that, unlike Koko and Ginko, they are
free from government control in preparing their business plans and
budgets.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra note 4, at 39.
' These companies, organized as joint-stock companies, were referred to as
"Tokushu-Gaisha" and were formed in order to provide public service in fields such as
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("JAL")' ° and Kokusai Denshen Denwa Co. ("KDD"), which pro-
vided international telephone services."1 The number of public corpora-
tions reached a high of 113 in 1967 and although the number of public
corporations has not increased since that time, the role of their business
operations in the economy has continued to expand. 2
In Japan, as in other countries, public enterprises are used for
those activities which the central government does not want to manage
directly, yet are believed to be of such importance to society that it is
imprudent to allow them simply to be provided by private enterprises,
even if the private firms are licensed and regulated.1" Among the ratio-
nales for using public enterprises are the following:14
1. Public enterprises insure a continuous and stable flow of ser-
vices in essential areas, such as telegraph and telephones, railways and
air transport, due to the government's ability to control price and rate
structures and to provide a steady flow of financing in the form of capi-
tal aid, loans and subsidies. In light of the need to rebuild Japan's
economic infrastructure following the aftermath of World War II, gov-
ernment intervention in such key areas as telecommunications and
transport became, in effect, a matter of "national security."' 5
2. Because they have access to loans from a wide range of govern-
ment accounts, public enterprises can implement projects that would be
difficult to conduct solely with annual government subsidies, such as for
international air transportation, electric power development, international electronic
communication, and investment for small and medium-sized enterprises. "Some receive
capital and loans directly from the national government, some indirectly, and some
receive no aid. Although there are certain legal provisions of government control over
their business management, they maintain stronger autonomy than other public corpo-
rations." Id. at 39-40.
'0 JAL was organized in 1951 as a special private corporation which allowed for
some form of private investment, although the MOT's status as the largest shareholder
was guaranteed by law. At the time of its privatization in the late 1980's, 34.5% of the
outstanding shares of JAL were still held by the government. JEI REPORT No. 32A,
supra note 5, at 2.
Il KKD was organized under the authority of the Ministry of Posts and Telecom-
munications ("MPT") in 1953. Id. at 2.
12 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra note 4, at 37-38.
13 Specifically, "public corporations are established by the [Japanese] government
by special laws as instruments for activities required by the state, when particular ac-
tivities are better managed in the form of a profit-making enterprise, when efficiency in
performance is more likely to be produced by such an enterprise than under direct
operation by the government, or when more flexibility in financial or personnel man-
agement is required than is normally possible under the. laws and regulations pertain-
ing to government agencies. Id. at 36.
14 The following list of rationales for using public enterprises is adopted from
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra note 4, at 42.
11 Among the specialized firms were the Housing Loan Corporation, Japan De-
velopment Bank, Export-Import Bank of Japan, Medical Loan Corporation and Envi-
ronmental Sanitation Corporation. JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 2.
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housing or highway construction. The ability to control these govern-
mental budget accounts provides the various ministries with a good deal
of discretion in advancing particular projects and in awarding new con-
tracts for construction and development.
3. Public financing enterprises can provide additional financing re-
sources in areas in which the private sector is ill-equipped to make the
requisite policy judgments and resource allocations, such as making
loans for enhancing productivity in agriculture, forestry and fishing,
promoting small and medium-sized industries and the development of
regional industries.
4. Public enterprises are appropriate when either the amount of
required capital is too large for private sources or when the venture
involves a high degree of risk and a low probability of profits. For
example, a public enterprise might be used for atomic energy develop-
ment, space development or the development of new technology. How-
ever, as the economy matures and new technologies are developed
which reduce the amount of capital required in order to provide a spec-
ified good or service, this argument becomes less compelling.
5. Public enterprises are appropriate when the activity must be
performed in a fair and impartial manner, as in inspections and autho-
rizations, although the licensing function can be performed without the
need to sanction a monopoly-type structure within the industry.
6. Finally, public enterprises can be more effectively managed to
reflect the overall national economic policies of the government. For
example, the government may use its influence over public corporations
to pursue its goals with respect to price controls, international technical
cooperation, promotion of employment and similar matters. Although
generally unstated, the public corporation's role as an instrument of
industrial policy has proven to be the most difficult obstacle to re-
forming public enterprises within Japan, even after each of the other
rationales has ceased to be applicable.
As a general rule, public corporations in Japan have been oper-
ated pursuant to a business plan, budget, and financial plan prepared
each year in consultation with the competent ministries. 6 Public corpo-
rations might have received capital investment by, or loans from, the
government, and were managed by officers selected by the ministries.
1
7
In turn, the corporations were free to recruit their own employees, al-
though in most cases compensation levels were established by the minis-
tries."8 The public corporations were usually given some form of exclu-
16 Id. at 43.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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sive rights in the business area, although the rate of compensation for
services was subject to approval by the goernment, and profits from
business operations were applied first to offset any prior losses with
any remaining amount held .in reserve, remitted to the government or,
if approved by the competent ministries, paid as dividends to investors,
if any.1 9 In marked contrast to their counterparts in the United States,
these firms were able to operate with full government support, with
little or no domestic competition in various markets and without the
need to satisfy the performance expectations of outside investors.
2 0
2.2. The Need for Reform
Little controversy existed regarding the purpose and performance
of the public enterprises during the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's as
Japan resurrected its domestic economy and transformed itself into an
international trade power. However, as the rate of economic growth
began to slow following the twin oil shocks of the 1970's, the public
corporations began to show little or no flexibility in dealing with labor
unions, establishing new prices or altering services.21 Moreover, the
profitability of these companies was rapidly eroding, exposing the pub-
lic to significant potential costs as taxpayers.2 2 Critics claimed that gov-
ernment backing was actually stifling the ability of the companies to
cut expenses and improve services.2 3 Whatever the cause, it was becom-
19 Id.
20 For example, AT&T has always been a private company with an obligation to
satisfy the expectations of its private shareholder investors, even though a good deal of
its activities were subject to government regulation. On the other hand, NTT was sub-
ject only to the demands of those government officials responsible for its operations.
JAL enjoyed the protection of government-mandated market segmentation in Japan,
while private airlines in the United States competed with each other and with interna-
tional carriers. JNR had no equivalent in the United States until the formation of
AMTRAK in the 1970's. JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 2.
21 In the minds of many people, public corporations were being overcome by inef-
ficient management, deteriorating services and continuous price increases. OECD Eco-
nomic Surveys:Japan (1987188) at 82 (hereinafter OECD Japan 1987188).
22 The performance of the JNR is often cited as evidence of the excessive burden
that the state-owned enterprises have imposed on taxpayers. For example, by 1983 the
JNR was losing about $25 million daily and had accumulated short- and long-term
debts which exceeded $120 billion. JNR's annual losses had risen to almost 20% of the
nation's annual budget deficit. Sakoh, Privatizing State-Owned Enterprises: A Japa-
nese Case Study, Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 51 (The Heritage Founda-
tion, Washington, D.C,, Sept. 4, 1986) at 1-2.
22 See OCED Japan 1987188, supra note 21, at 81-82. In particular, since the
public corporations had a mandate to provide public services, even in unprofitable ar-
eas, it was difficult for the firms to set and pursue profit or growth objectives commen-
surate with their counterparts in the private sector. As a result, the public corporations
tended to become inefficient, thereby undermining one of the key reasons for continuing
government intervention. Part of the problem was the structure under which public
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ing clear that the performance of the public companies had fallen be-
hind those in the private sector,2 as well as their counterparts in other
areas of the industrialized world.2 5
Operational concerns about the public companies were exacer-
bated by a number of difficult fiscal problems confronting the govern-
ment in the wake of its expansionary policies adopted in response to
external political demands in the early 1970's28 and to the recessionary
pressures of the late 1970s. The level of government debt, and corre-
sponding interest payment obligations, had risen dramatically. 27 In re-
sponse, in 1979 the government initiated a policy of steady and moder-
ate fiscal restraint,28 including a reduction in the role of investment by
companies operated. First, Diet approval was required for annual budgets and invest-
ment plans, leading to blurred management responsibility and impeding the develop-
ment of an adequate system of independent corporate decision-making. Second, since
employment was essentially assured by the government and wages were determined
without regard to productivity, it was difficult for the companies to develop appropriate
internal incentives. Finally, the absence of competition contributed to continuing opera-
tional inefficiencies. Although the public corporations had enjoyed legal monopolies for
some period of time, it was believed that meaningful competition could be rapidly cre-
ated under appropriate conditions. Even in many capital-intensive industries, such as
the airlines, potential entry and exit was facilitated by the ease of buying, selling or
leasing second-hand fixed assets. In such industries, efficiency could be promoted and
excessive profits eliminated by allowing new entrants to challenge large, established
companies. In other industries, such as telecommunications, where investment, once
committed, cannot be recovered by the sale of fixed assets (e.g., telephone cables), new
technology often reduced the importance of economies of scale, making greater competi-
tion more feasible. Id.
24 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 2-4. Obviously, there was no real
private counterpart to NTT which could be used as a basis for comparison. However,
it was becoming clear that private firms, many of which had worked closely with NTT
on basic research and product development, now had the capital and expertise to pro-
vide some of the services provided by NTT. Also, technological developments allowed
"smaller" firms to compete with the services NTT provided through more costly "ma-
ture" techniques. Id.
" For example, JNR was characterized as one of the most inefficient and over-
staffed railroads in the world and had "several times as many employees per revenue
mile as any other railroad system in the industrialized world." Sakoh, supra note 22, at
2.
26 In the early 1970s, Japan "was experiencing the very high economic growth
rate of about ten percent (10%) annually with low inflation and a trade surplus of $6
billion with the U.S. The Nixon Administration demanded. . . that Japan stimulate
its domestic economy with government spending to increase imports[. Japan] complied
by raising wages for government employees and expanding social welfare, public works
and other government programs. As a result, the annual budget jumped from 20 per-
cent of GNP in 1971 to 34 percent in 1981. Social security expenditures soared from
4.5 percent of GNP in 1971 to 11 percent in 1981." Id. at 3-4.
27 Total government debt had risen to 52% of GNP in Japan by 1984, compared
with 47% in the United Kingdom, 45% in the United States and 21% in West Ger-
many. Id. at 1.
28 "As a result, the general government deficit has come down from 4.4 per cent of
GNP in FY 1979 to 3.0 per cent by FY 1983." OECDJapan 1985, supra note 21, at
47. "By the mid-1980s, the general government deficit was smaller, as a percentage of
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public corporations.29 The government intended to seek further reduc-
tions in the public sector deficit by limiting public expenditure over the
medium term, reasoning that first, "economic vitality is sapped when
the public sector becomes too large; secondly, that the burden of accu-
mulated debt was too heavy; and, thirdly, that the rapid aging of the
population would pose severe problems."30
While the government was determined to reduce the overall level
of debt,3 domestic and international pressure to deal with the perceived
problems caused by an excessive structural current account balance was
building. For example, the official Okita Report enumerated a number
of suggestions for stimulating domestic demand, even as the govern-
ment was tightening its fiscal stance, including simplifying regulations
that stifle market focus and increasing investment in the social infra-
structure, particularly by the private sector.3" The- government also
came under a good deal of pressure to reverse its policy of minimizing
new investment expenditures.
As a result of these factors, the government undertook a number of
studies aimed at solving the nation's fiscal and trade difficulties, includ-
ing administrative reform and transforming the structure of government
activities."3 The inefficiencies of the public corporations had already led
GNP, in Japan than in most other OECD countries. However, the central government
still ran a large deficit (3.1 per cent of GNP in FY 1986)[, while c]entral government
bonds outstanding amounted to nearly 50 per cent of GNP and gross interest payments
were 19.8 per cent of total budget expenditure (FY 1988 budget estimates) .... [T]he
public sector deficit - . . general government plus state enterprises - was also large,
amounting to 2.5 per cent of GNP in FY 1986." Id. at 33-36.
29 Most of the traditional public enterprises had incurred substantial losses. In
order to reduce these deficits, investment by the public enterprises was reduced from
over 3 per cent of GNP to 2.3 per cent by FY 1983. Id. at 50.
30 Id. at 47.
31 The government was intent on eliminating "current deficits," which had been
funded through the issuance of so-called "deficit-financing" bonds, by FY 1984. How-
ever, due to weakness in the economy leading to large revenue shortfalls in 1981 and
1982, the government revised its deadline for eliminating "deficit financing" bonds to
FY 1990. Id. at 47-48.
32 Id. at 53-54.
" The Provincial Commission for Administrative Reform (or "Rincho", 1981-83)
was one of a series of advisory bodies established by the government to consult with the
prime minister regarding deregulation during the 1980's. While Rincho focused on re-
ducing the size of government through organizational consolidation and the privatiza-
tion of certain public enterprises, it made little progress with respect to deregulation,
other than in the telecommunications sector. The Provisional Council for the Promotion
of Administrative Reform (1983-86), convened in an era of heightened trade difficulties
between Japan and the United States, concentrated on the improvement of access to the
domestic market. The Provisional Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform
(1987-90) proposed the relaxation of a wide range of governmental regulations in both
the economic and social spheres, including recommendations for deregulation in whole-
sale and retail marketing, distribution, information and communications, finance, en-
ergy, agricultural produce and new businesses. Uekusa, supra note 1, at 252-54.
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to a number of suggestions for reform. First of all, it was suggested
that since the government already had relatively strong control over the
business, budget and personnel matters of each corporation and was
well-positioned to insure the continued delivery of vital public services,
the entities should be given more operational autonomy, mobility and
flexibility. 5 Secondly, it was suggested that certain of the corporations
should be liquidated or reorganized in order to simplify the overall
structure of public services.3 Thirdly, it was suggested that manage-
ment should be rationalized and efficiency enhanced through reductions
in personnel, abolition of internal organizations and the implementation
of automation efforts.
37
The deliberations of a number of ad hoc committees ultimately led
to recommendations that NTT, JNR and JTS be reorganized into pri-
vately-managed firms in which stock was to be owned by the govern-
ment and/or private investors, although share ownership by private in-
vestors was to be restricted to Japanese citizens.38 Determined to shrink
the size of government and limit the risks to future fiscal solvency
caused by the continued operation of the state enterprises, Prime Min-
ister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who had taken office in 1982, eventually ac-
cepted the recommendations of the committees and undertook to priva-
tize NTT and JTS by April 1985 and JNR by 1987."9 In addition to
privatization, which was primarily aimed at reducing the fiscal difficul-
ties associated with the public enterprises, substantial regulatory re-
forms were to be undertaken, particularly in the telecommunications
and air transport sectors.
As discussed in greater detail below, Nakasone was one of the
most powerful leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"),
which has controlled Japanese politics since the beginning of the post-
34 The Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform had submitted a report
in 1964 to the Prime Minister which led to serious consideration of the need to consoli-
date and reorganize the public corporations. At that time, the government decided to
dismantle some of the public corporations whose continued existence was unnecessary
and to consolidate those with similar functions. Also, in 1979, a major reorganization
program was formulated calling for the abolition or consolidation of some of the corpo-
rations. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN, supra note 4, at 44-5.
35 Id. at 44.
36 Id. at 44-45.
37 Id. at 45.
311 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 3.
39 Id. at 3-4. "Privatize" really had a different meaning with respect to each of
the public corporations. For example, as a first step, operational control of NTT and
JTS was to be turned over to private management, although the shares of stock were to
be owned by the government until plans could be made to sell a portion of such shares
to the "public" in order to raise revenues for the government. On the other hand, the
government only owned about 35% of the shares of JAL, which were to be sold to the
public as part of the divestiture and deregulation process.
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'War reconstruction period. As Prime Minister and leader of the major-
ity party, Nakasone was able to exercise a good deal of authority over
each of the competent ministries involved in the privatization schemes,
as well as control the management of each of the public corporations.
Moreover, the politics of privatization almost ensured that the future
prospects of NTT and the other companies would be linked to internal
LDP matters.
2.3. Implementation of the Privatization Measures
Nakasone's announced intent to privatize the public companies
and deregulate many of the activities previously undertaken by such
companies complemented the liberalization that was taking place in the
United States and other developed countries in the telecommunications,
airlines and financial services areas. Privatization of the public corpora-
tions brought with it the promise of improving the government's finan-
cial position by increasing revenues and eliminating certain public ex-
penditures,4 and providing an opportunity to utilize private funds to
fund investment programs which had been delayed or postponed by the
government in the early 1980's. However, the impending privatization
led to a number of tensions between various sectors of the government
and other groups seeking to maintain their own spheres of interest. For
example, labor unions delayed implementation of the measures until
they had received adequate protections regarding hiring and firing,
strike provisions and pension plans,4 and the companies themselves ar-
gued that they must retain an adequate asset base in order to insure an
orderly transition and continuity of services. The United States also
seized upon the measures, seeing an opportunity to push for increased
foreign access to the domestic markets.
"0 Privatization was anticipated to have a significant effect on estimated tax reve-
nues in the FY 1985 Budget. For example, revenue from the Tobacco Corporation,
which appeared as non-tax revenue in earlier budgets, was to take the form of a con-
sumption tax estimated at - 882 billion and the corporation tax to be imposed on
NTT was expected to bring in approximately Y 100 billion. OECD Economic Surveys:
Japan (August 1985) (hereinafter OECD Japan 1985) at 32-34. Privatization and
limited liberalization also offered the opportunity to reduce government spending with-
out cutting back on services and avoided the political difficulties that would have been
created by any attempt to raise taxes to fund the government deficits. Sakoh, supra note
22, at 1.
" The public corporations had the largest and most powerful labor unions in
Japan. The unions argued that privatization would lead to a loss of jobs for their
members and would transfer member loyalty from the union to the "new" companies.
The attitude of the unions also had an effect on the political process of enhancing
opposition to the privatization legislation, since the unions provided the main support
for each of the Japanese Socialist Party, which was the second largest political party in
Japan, and the Communist Party in Japan. Sakoh, supra note 22, at 2.
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/5
PRVATIZATION
In light of the intensity of the maneuvering among the disparate
interest groups, it was important for Nakasone to forge a consensus
package which satisfied, at least to some extent, each of the objections
raised. In doing so, Nakasone developed a strategy consisting of the
following elements:"'
1. Preservation of Key Services. In order to alleviate concerns that
privatization would materially disrupt the scope and quality of services
provided to the public, Nakasone delivered assurances that the govern-
ment's transfer of the assets of, and management control over, the pub-
lic corporations would be gradual. For example, the companies would
be permitted to operate with most, if not all, of their own existing as-
sets and business, thereby preserving a good deal of the competitive
advantage accruing from their capital and asset base. However, in re-
turn, the companies would remain obligated to provide the same level
of services, including continuing businesses which had proven to be uh-
profitable when operated as a public trust.
2. Assurances of Employment. Private businesses were strongly
urged to offer employment to those public corporation employees who
voluntarily resigned - an important item in a society in which job
security and lifetime employment was a specific objective of almost any
type of commercial enterprise. This served to decrease the power of the
labor unions to block any of the proposed changes.
3. Avoidance of Political and Bureaucratic Processes. Nakasone
utilized various advisory bodies and deliberation councils to make rec-
ommendations and secure the support of highly-placed and respected
officials, thereby hoping to avoid the delays which might be caused by
extended parliamentary debate and bureaucratic maneuvering.
4. Management Support. Nakasone replaced those executive of-
ficers of the public corporations who were opposed to the privatization
efforts. In doing so, Nakasone was able to reduce the influence of mem-
bers of the LDP who had close ties to the "old guard" and who prom-
ised to fight any effort to denationalize key industries. 4 '
5. Public Sentiment. An appeal to public sentiment was made
through the mass media and sought to "educate" consumers and tax-
42 Id. at 5. The elements listed below are adopted from that article.
's For example, Nakasone took the unprecedented step of dismissing the President
of the JNR and replacing him with his own man. See id. Moreover, Shinto Hisashi,
President of NTT, became an outspoken advocate of the virtues of privatization for all
aspects of the Japanese telecommunications system. See Shinto, JAPAN Q., 380, 380-
383 (October 31, 1984). Dr. Shinto was recruited by the Keidanren as a candidate for
President of NTT in order to promote liberalization internally and to manage the
privatization of the firm. Harris, Telecommunications Policy in Japan: Lessons for the
U.S. at 12.
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payers regarding the degree of mismanagement and lack of worker dis-
cipline in the public firms, particularly in the JNR.
Nakasone's accommodation of and balancing of most of the com-
peting demands of the ministries, trade unions, foreigners and manag-
ers of the subject companies, as well as the interests of the members of
his own ruling LDP,4' finally led to Diet approval of the various
privatization plans, beginning with support of Nakasone's plans for
NTT and JTS in 1984."' In 1987 despite strong labor opposition,
privatization for JNR, including a large reduction in the railroad's
workforce, was finally accepted as the sole means of saving and revital-
izing a company crumbling under the weight of excessive levels of debt
and personnel.46 KDD was to remain a special private corporation,
with the government as the largest shareholder, but would no longer be
the sole provider of international telecommunications services.4 7 JAL
was to be fully privatized through the public sale of the government's
remaining stake in the company.48 Eventually, foreign firms were to be
allowed to join the new domestic competitors of NTT and foreigners
were allowed to make significant inroads into Japan's domestic ciga-
rette market.
The government planned to use the anticipated revenues from
privatization to finance the domestic expansion called for by critics at
home and abroad. For example, the government's budgets for 1987 and
1988 called for sharp increases in the level of expenditures on public
works projects49 and it was originally announced that most of the
* 1.3 trillion interest-free loans for public works would be financed
from the proceeds of the NTT offering. 50 Additional public investment
4 Certain members of the LDP actually benefitted to some degree from govern-
ment control of the public corporations, including the government's ability to allocate
any new supplemental services and research projects to certain regions, and fought
against the privatization proposals. Also, since a good deal of the support for the LDP
came from rural areas, any privatization plan had to insure that rural services were not
impaired, even though they tended to be unprofitable. Sakoh, supra note 22, at 2.
'5 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 3.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 3-4.
49 "The draft central government Initial Budget for FY 1988 [provided] that the
level of public works spending (which sharply increased in FY 1987) will be main-
tained. The OECD projections imply that total public works expenditure will rise by
1.4 per cent in FY 1988 . . ." OECD Japan 1987188, supra note 21, at 36.
'0 Id. at 37. It was originally hoped that the sale of public assets would produce
*sufficient revenues to assist in meeting the government's bond reduction objectives. Id.
at 39. However, although the proceeds from the sale of the NTT shares were originally
intended for bond redemption,. . . at the time of the supplementary budget in July
1987 it was decided to use part of the proceeds to finance new interest-free loans for
[new public works projects]." Id. at 110-11.
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was to be supplied through the activities of public enterprises, through
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, and local governments.
5
Thus, the government had a good deal of incentive to accelerate the
privatization process and to maximize the value that was to be received
from the sale of its interests.
3. THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: NTT AND THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
3.1. Background: NTT and Domestic Telecommunications Services
While the privatization of each of the major public enterprises in
Japan during the late 1980's carries with it a unique set of circum-
stances and lessons, it is the story of NTT, the sheer size and magni-
tude of which affected all aspects of the domestic economic and political
life of Japan, that is most intriguing and which has captured the atten-
tion of analysts. NTT was established in 195252 and, until the deregu-
lation of the industry in the mid-1980's, was the sole supplier of do-
mestic telecommunications services in Japan.5" The decision to grant
the monopoly to NTT was based on the belief that the Japanese
needed to rapidly reconstruct the telecommunications infrastructure
which had been destroyed during World War II, and that this objective
would best be achieved without the needless overinvestment which
might occur if more than one firm were permitted to compete in the
industry.54 Moreover, government officials realized that no single firm
was then capable of committing the financial resources that would be
required to satisfy the demand for services and to build a national
network. 5
51 Under the initial budget plan for FY 1988, total FILP investment (excluding
investment by public financial institutions) was projected to increase by 6.8 %. Sec-
ondly, the Local Finance Plan indicated a rise in total expenditure by local government
of 6.3 % in FY 1988, with investment up by 11 per cent. Id. at 39.
52 The enabling legislation for NTT was the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Public Corporation Law (Law 250, 1952). Cole and O'Rorke, Project Managers, Tele-
communication Policies in Seventeen Countries: Prospects for Future Competitive Ac-
cess, U.S. Department of Commerce (NTIA-CR 83-24) (May 1983) at 138. Most of
the Ministry of Communications was transferred to the new public corporation, except
for regulatory functions, which were transferred to the MPT. Harris, supra note 43, at
6.
11 Nambu, Deregulation in Japan in CHANGING THE RuLES 147, 152. Interna-
tional telecommunications services were supplied through KDD, a monopoly public
corporation to which NTT transferred its own international division in 1953. Id.
" Japanese officials wanted to standardize the nation's telecommunications net-
work and provide complete direct distance dialing service nationwide, all as part of its
overall objective to equalize access to telecommunications services. Id.
55 Id.
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Originally, NTT's structure was modelled after AT&T, in that it
was an integrated provider of local and inter-exchange telephone ser-
vices, although unlike AT&T, NTT was not vertically integrated into
equipment manufacturing.56 Instead, NTT used its massive procure-
ment needs as incentives to various "NTT family members," such as
NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu and Oki, to undertake substantial research, de-
sign and development projects in the telecommunications area.57 By
law, NTT and its international counterpart KDD, were given absolute
control over all aspects of the design, construction, operation and main-
tenance of the telecommunications infrastructure in Japan."8
At the time that NTT was founded, it had 1.37 million subscrib-
ers and the unfilled demand for access amounted to 340,000 subscrib-
ers. 59 However, due to the tremendous growth in Japan's economy and
corresponding growth of its service requirements, by 1970 demand had
grown to 2.91 million potential subscribers.60 As a result of a series of
five-year construction plans, by 1977 NTT was finally able to satisfy
the demand for services and, by 1979, had achieved its other main ob-
jective of nationwide service.61 By 1984, NTT had nearly 44 million
subscribers. 2 The rapid-growth in the subscriber base was particularly
acute in the residential sector and by 1984, residential telephones ac-
counted for about 70% of total telephones, up from only 25% of the
" Harris, supra note 43, at 7.
67 Id. While Japan has relied, to some extent, on telecommunications technology
developed in the United States, including a close working relationship with Bell Labs,
NTT and its family members have also expended considerable amounts on basic re-
search and development. By 1984, Japanese telecommunications technology was
roughly equivalent to that of the United States and family members had emerged as
global competitors in components, computers.and communications technology. Id. at 9-
10.
8 The basis for this control was the Wire Telecommunications Law of 1953 and
the Public Telecommunications Law of 1953, which were to remain in effect until
1984. Id. at 7-8. The laws did permit private construction of wire facilities, so long as
they were not used for third-party communications, although approval from MPT
would be required if any such facility would in any way affect the public network.
Since Japan is so narrow, and such a large portion of the population resides in the
Tokyo-Osaka corridor, MPT concerns about "frequency congestion" effectively limited
the spread of private wire facilities to entities such as the Japanese National Railways.
(for train control) and to the Ministry of Construction (for traffic management on na-
tional highways). Id. at 8 and n.14.
59 Nambu, supra note 53, at 152. The ratio of subscribers to the total population,
referred to as the "diffusion rate," was 1.8%. The ratio of residential subscribers to the
total number of households, referred to as the "penetration rate," was about 0.6%. Id.
6o Id. The annual growth rate of subscribers, including unfulfilled demand, was
about 14% from 1952 to 1970, while real economic growth during that period was
about 10%. However, the diffusion rate and the penetration ratio increased to 15.7%
and 25.4%, respectively, by 1970. Id.
61 Id. at 153.
62 Id.
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total telephones in 1960.63 It was observed that the growth in personal
income and the desire for more convenient services in the household
sector greatly contributed to the enhanced emphasis on residential
services.6
NTT's total revenues in 1984 had reached 4.75 trillion yen, in-
cluding 2.5 trillion yen from telephone calls, 990 billion yen from basic
fees and 380 billion yen from private-lines. 5 Even though the volume
of long-distance calls accounted for only - 27% of the total volume of
calls in that year, long-distance revenues contributed more than 76% of
the total revenues from telephone calls, thereby suggesting that long-
distance revenues were used to cross-subsidize basic fees and the provi-
sion of local services. 6 The existence of such a cross-subsidy was not
surprising in light of the wide disparity that had traditionally existed in
the prices for local and long-distance services, with the ratio of the most
expensive long-distance service (in the daytime) more than double that
which existed in the United States, West Germany and France.
67
The momentum for privatizing NTT and liberalizing the entire
Japanese telecommunications industry came from a number of dispa-
rate forces which collided during the 1980's. Prior to the sweeping
changes in 1985, two significant amendments had been made to Ja-
pan's telecommunications laws. In 1971, NTT's monopoly over termi-
nal equipment, other than the "first phone," was eliminated under
amendments permitting the connection of PBX's to the NTT network
through leased circuits.6 NTT was authorized to provide data trans-
mission services over leased lines or public circuits.6 9 However, there
63 Id.
Id. at 154. Expressing the growth in the telecommunications sector as a func-
tion of the demand for calls, the volume of three-minute calls grew at an annual rate of
8.1% between 1977 and 1984, including a 10% annual growth rate between 1980 and
1984. The annual growth rates for local calls exceeded comparable increases for long-
distance services, which reflecting the growing ratio of residential-user demand to total
demand and the fact that long distance demand might be satisfied by various "substi-
tutes," such as private-line and data communications services. Id. at 153-54.
'5 Nambu, supra note 53, at 155.
68 Id.
67 Id. at 154, where it is noted that, until 1980, the ratio stood at 72 to 1, which
far exceeded the ratio of the actual costs of such services, as well as comparable ratios
of around 15 to 1 in the countries cited in the text. The ratio was reduced as a result of
NTT's attempt to lower the price of long-distance services beyond certain distances;
however, the ratio still stood at 40 to 1 in 1984. NTT's rate structure until the mid-
1980's is summarized in Nambu at pages 154-55 and reflects pricing of long-distance
services at well above average costs while the basic fee and price for local calls is far
below average cost. Id. at 154-55. For an economic analysis of the policy choices associ-
ated with reforms to NTT's rate structure, see id. at 158-173.
" Harris, supra note 43, at 8.
69 Id.
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was no authorization for value-added services and third-party providers
of data processing services could not transmit data over leased circuits.70
But, in 1982, further amendments authorized privately-operated data
networks ("VANs"),7' although by that time NTT itself was substan-
tially involved in providing large-scale value-added services, such as on-
line reservations systems and financial information services.
7 2
At the same time, a number of other factors were operating toward
some form of change in NTT's role and structure. First of all, MITI
and the MPT continued their ongoing "turf fight" in the development
of the data processing industry in Japan, which had raged since the
prior decade. Second, pressure was coming from the United States for
liberalization of prior restrictions on imports of telecommunications
products into Japan. Third,. a number of large domestic companies had
concerns regarding NTT's announced goal to develop the Information
Network System, or "INS," which was to be a single network that
would provide data, voice and video transmissions 73 thereby making
70 Id. at 8-9.
7 Id. at 9. Although prior notification to the MPT was required, privately-oper-
ated VAN services were permitted among closely-affiliated groups of small or medium-
sized users and essential links between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers were
permitted. Id.
As of July 1984, 39 companies had filed with the [MPT] requesting ap-
proval for 46 systems [under the regulations with respect to VAN ser-
vices.] Many of the systems are for the exchange of messages within a
company and with its affiliates, or else are part of rationalization efforts
designed to minimize communications costs .... [C]ompanies operating
VANs include data processing firms like Intex and Japan Electric Com-
putation; major computer manufacturers such as Fujitsu and Nippon
Electric Co., both through affiliates; Japan Information Service, an affili-
ate of Sumitomo Bank; Nomura-Computer Systems, which is affiliated
with Nomura Securities, Mitsui group's [sic] Mitsui Information Develop-
ment and Seibu Information Center, connected with the Seibu Distribu-
tion Group.
Toshio, The New Media Nebula, JAPAN Q. 384, 385-86 (October 31, 1984).
12 Harris, supra note 43, at 9. In the United States, AT&T was forbidden from
engaging in data processing and enhanced information services activities. Id.
7' The INS, which arose out of technical innovations in the areas of large scale
integration, digital switchboards, optical fibers and communications satellites, was in-
tended to integrate the various communications networks which were then structured in
accordance with different kinds of services, through the use of rapidly changing ad-
vances in digital technology and other fields. As such, NTT anticipated that it would
be able to provide not only telephone services, but other services such as facsimile and
data communications. As a result, NTT would be able to provide the consumer with
more services at a lower cost, and in a more.convenient manner, with distance-related
differences and charges reduced to a minimum. The system would serve as the basic
infrastructure of the emerging sophisticated information oriented society. Shinto, supra
,note 43, at 383. Initial test services of INS would focus on target households in the
Tokyo area and would begin by supplying information from 320 financial institutions,
trading firms, retailers and the mass media. Toshio, supra note 71, at 387.
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any existing investment in "VANs"7 4 redundant and crippling the
plans of the railways and power companies, who owned and operated
their own telecommunications systems, to sell spare capacity." In addi-
tion, NTT's ability to effectively cross-subsidize other activities made it
a powerful potential competitor of computer services companies and
equipment manufacturers. 76 Finally, as discussed above, privatization
of NTT became an important element of the government's fiscal
policies.
Serious consideration of deregulating the domestic telecommunica-
tions industry began in 1980 when the MPT established a Telecommu-
nications Advisory Council. The Council's report, "A Vision of Tele-
communications Policy in the '80s," took note of the rapid technological
progress, more sophisticated and diverse user needs, and the growing
dependence of the nation upon information. The report recommended
that Japanese telecommunications policy seek greater regulatory flexi-
bility, distinguish between monopoly and competitive services, increase
cooperation with the private sector, improve delivery of data transmis-
sion services, and develop a new integrated network.
77
74 In 1983, the estimated market for private VANs was $700 million and the then
current projections estimated that the value of the market would increase to $4 billion
by 1990. HILLS, DEREGULATING TELEcoMs: COMPETITION AND CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND BRITAIN 138 (1986). Given the potential growth in the
VAN market, particularly when compared to the domestic telecommunications market,
other private companies, such as the equipment manufacturers, had come to covet ac-
cess to the VAN market, as well as to the expanding computer services area. This
desire was particularly acute given that the manufacturers were no longer dependent
upon business with NTT. In fact, NTT itself had begun to sell new telephones into the
"first telephone" market, over which it still held a monopoly. Id.
71 INS would also have enhanced the power and authority of the MPT at the
expense of MITI by reducing, if not eliminating, the influence of MITI in the impor-
tant data processing and information services sectors. Id.
76 NTT's 1983 net earnings of $1.5 billion, as well as the 14% annual growth in
data communications and leased circuit revenue, made NTT a prime target for criti-
cism by those private companies seeking to enter the market and to establish their own
nationwide or company-to-company VAN networks. NTT ANN. REP. (1982-83), at
36, reported in HILLS, supra note 74, at 139. The litany of complaints about NTT
ranged from dissatisfaction with the high trunk call charges, NTT's monopoly of the
"first telephone," to the lack of customized billing, and a general feeling that NTT had
become too bureaucratic and unresponsive to industry and was no longer sufficiently
driven by the demands of the marketplace. HILLS at 139. The cost of long-distance
transmission and value-added services had declined relative to the cost of basic local
services. However, since the Diet, which recognized the value of low-cost residential
services, set telephone rates, large users of long-distance services grew concerned about
the size and economic effect of cross-subsidization from businesses to residences. There-
fore, large business users, led by the Keidanren, began to push for further liberaliza-
tion of the private network and VAN capabilities afforded by the 1982 changes. Har-
ris, supra note 43, at 11-12.
7 Harris, supra note 43, at 13.
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3.2. The Privatization and Deregulation Debate
The first formal proposals for the privatization of NTT arose out
of the deliberations of the Second Ad Hoc Commission on Administra-
tive Reform (the "Commission"), which was chaired by Toshio Doko,
who had previously headed Keidanren.7 8 The Commission was formed
in 1981 "to study the efficiency of government agencies and opera-
tions.'" 79 The Commission's report, which set forth a number of recom-
mendations regarding NTT, was presented to the government in July
1982, although the final report was not to be submitted until March
1983. In its report, the Commission recommended the following:
1. Operational Restructuring. NTT was to be split into regional
operating companies, which would service local exchanges and sub-
scribers. The main, or "national," element of NTT would continue to
be responsible for research activities80 and long-distance calls."1 The
"new" NTT would have a structure similar to that of AT&T before its
deregulation, although NTT's lack of international services made a
true comparison between the forms more difficult."2 While it is not
clear why the AT&T structure was chosen, other than the fact that it
permitted the Japanese to borrow from the prior experiences of deregu-
78 Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki appointed the Commission for a two year term
in 1981 for the purpose of reviewing the civil service system and government deficits
and recommending measures relating to streamlining administrative procedures and re-
ducing costs into the next century. While the original goal of the Commission was to
effectively replicate the parallel efforts of the Reagan era and the Thatcher government
by reducing the numbers of civil servants, NTT's profitability quickly made it an addi-
tional target for review, particularly in light of the concerns of large businesses and
MITI's belief that liberalization of the telecommunications area would allow it to
recoup some of its authority in relation to the MPT. HILLS, supra note 74, at 139.
' Harris, supra note 43, at 13-14.
Although much of the NTT's role in the technological development of telecom-
munications services (including communications equipment) had been gradually trans-
ferred to equipment manufacturers belonging to the so-called "NTT family" (NEC
Corporation, Fujitsu Ltd., Old Electric Industry Company, Hitachi Ltd.), NTT still
played a leading role in this field, especially in the area of basic research. NTT spent
91 billion yen on research and development in fiscal year 1983, which represented 27%
of total research and development expenditure (including spending by the Government)
in this sector. In the early 1970's, NTT's share of research and development expendi-
ture in the telecommunications sector had exceeded 50% . In the United States, the
ratio of federal expenditures to total expenditures for research and development in the
communications equipment industry was about 0.4 in 1980, according to a National
Science Foundation survey. Nambu, supra note 53, at 157.
81 HiLLs, supra note 74, at 140.
82 Id. NTT also did not have an independent manufacturing capability, as did
AT&T. NTT had begun to sell, rather than rent, telephone equipment to its subscrib-
ers, thereby competing with the marketing organizations of those companies from
which NTT had purchased the equipment. The fact that NTT continued to control the
"first telephone" made its marketing activities particularly threatening to the equip-
ment manufacturers. Id. at 138.
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lation in the United States, it is possible that there was some belief that
the new structure would make it more difficult for NTT to cross-subsi-
dize activities in those areas where new competition was anticipated.8
2. Privatization. NTT would be privatized over a period of five
years, commencing with the formation of a new special corporation
whose stock was initially to be held by the government. Over the five
year period, the government would sell off its stock in the central
"long-lines" company, which itself would be selling off stock in each of
the regional operating companies. " It was believed that the prospect of
privatizing NTT would lead to new investment in the telecommunica-
tions and data processing areas as competitors began to enter markets
previously held by NTT85 and new markets arising out of new technol-
ogies and the needs of large company subscribers. Ideally, from a capi-
tal markets perspective, new funds would begin to flow into the tele-
communications area, just as had been the case in the United States
when the possibility of an AT&T "break-up" was announced.
3. NTT Responsibilities. "The central [NTT] was to be responsi-
ble for construction, maintenance and operation of the basic trunk lines,
to own and run the telecommunications laboratories and to provide lo-
cal corporations with technical advice." '88 Over time competitors would
be licensed to enter the basic trunk area.87 Also, it was recommended
that NTT carry out a number of "rationalization" plans, such as re-
ducing the number of employees, and that NTT should improve certain
of its existing services, such as maintenance and repairs. 8
After the Commission published its report in July 1982, it was
referred to the Telecommunications Policy Committee within the
LDP." Privatization and liberalization were billed as a means on in-
creasing NTT's efficiency, allowing the redeployment of workers into
new sectors.90 Advocates of the new proposal argued that NTT had, in
83 Id. at 140.
84 Id.
85 Although it was anticipated that NTT would have competition regarding many
of its existing services, most analysts believed that the Japanese telecommunications
market had reached maturity in many areas. As such, new competitors were likely to
focus upon the opportunities created by the convergence of telecommunications and
data processing. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 140-41.
89 Id. at 141.
90 Many analysts believed that NTT had too many employees. In fact, it was
proposed that NTT should reduce its workforce from 320,000 to 230,000 over fifteen
years. Similarly, concerns had been raised regarding the dependency (90%) of NTT on
revenues from the "mature" telephone market. Id. at 142. Presumably, a government-
directed company lacking diversification and running with inefficient personnel prac-
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fact, completed its designated task of reviving the telecommunications
infrastructure of Japan; there were no waiting lists for telephones and
the basic network had been put in place. As such, it was now time to
turn over any further growth and development to the private sector.91
However, it came as no surprise that the reactions to the proposals of
the Commission were decidedly mixed, reflecting many of the tensions
which existed among large and small businesses, labor, and government
officials regarding Japan's overall policies for domestic development
and international trade.
The Keidanren, which generally represented the interests of the
larger companies in Japan,92 seized upon the Commission's recommen-
dations as a basis for arguing for complete liberalization of line usage
for voice and data communications, termination of NTT's monopoly
over the "first telephone," divestment of NTT's computer services busi-
ness, limiting NTT to the supply of communication circuits. 93 On the
other hand, the Keidanren was willing to allow for an easing of the
burden of regulation on NTT at the time it was to be converted into a
stock company.94 While Keidanren had originally been supportive of
the planned "break-up" of NTT, it ultimately agreed to a compromise
which would not include a "break-up," but rather would call for a
further review of NTT's position after five years in the new liberalized
environment. 95
The Communications Industry Association of Japan ("CIAJ")
represented 178 companies' which manufactured equipment for use in
the telecommunications market. 6 While the CIAJ had provided its tes-
timony to the Commission in favor of the notion of privatizing NTT,
the manufacturers remained concerned about the effect that the scheme
might have upon the conduct of research activities and the manner in
which any new technologies might be transferred within private indus-
try. At that time, NTT undertook basic research while private manu-
tices was inconsistent with any effort to reduce budgetary deficits.
91 Id. at 143.
92 At the time, Keidanren represented over 800 companies, including such indus-
trial giants as Toyota, Nippon Steel and Tokyo Electric. It also had about ten foreign
companies among its membership, including NCR, Olivetti, IBM and Phillips, as well
as NTT and KDD. NTT and KDD, however, could not participate in any delibera-
tions regarding telecommunications policies. Keidanren had its own Telecommunica-
tions Policy Committee, of which IBM was one of its members, and had testified in
favor of privatization to the Commission. Id. at 141.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 141-42.
95 Id. at 142.
96 Id. at 141. The CIAJ was dominated by relatively small manufacturers; 44% of
its members at the time had an annual turnover of less than $500,000 and only 33 of
its members had an annual turnover which exceeded $2.5 billion. Id.
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facturers were responsible for developmental work. Since members of
the "NTT family" did not have to pay a fee to NTT for the use of
patents for technology developed during the course of NTT's basic re-
search, certain members of the CIAJ were concerned that a privatized
NTT would then attempt to sell or license the patents for profit.
9 7
Also, some wondered whether NTT would begin to focus on "short-
term" research if it was privatized, thereby forcing private firm com-
petitors to bear the expense of long-term research projects.98
NTT management, led by President Hisashi Shinto, who had
strong ties to the Keidanren, and its trade union, Zendentsu, also
needed to formulate their views on the proposed changes. Although
privatization was a disappointment to those within NTT who favored
the development of Information Network Services ("INS"),99 top NTT
management came to see the new changes as a way to achieve more
managerial autonomy through freedom from Diet control over budget-
ary matters, as well as a means for moving away from the stagnating
telephone market into some of the new opportunities provided by data
and information systems.100 However, NTT management had little tol-
erance for the "break-up" into local and long-line companies, arguing
that limiting NTT's financial base to that which might be provided by
a pure long-lines business, with competition, would cripple the firm's
ability to provide any form of INS or finance any of its ongoing
responsibilities. 10
Zendentsu, which appeared to have done a good deal of the actual
lobbying on behalf of itself and NTT management, shared the concerns
of NTT management regarding a "break-up" scenario. As for priva-
tization in general, it offered NTT employees the opportunity to be
97 Id. On the other hand, manufacturers hoped that a privatized firm would be
free to purchase equipment from Japanese suppliers, as had historically been the case,
without being required by government mandate to enter into guaranteed procurement
agreements with American firms as part of the ongoing trade debates between the two
countries. Id.
98 Id.
9 See id. at 143. Specifically, planners believed that privatization would foreclose
development of the INS on a nationwide basis as a public service. Id.
100 See Shinto, supra note 43, at 380-83. According to Shinto, reform was re-
quired for a number of reasons:
The needs of users have become sophisticated and diversified. The advent
of a variety of new media, such as optical fibers and communications satel-
lites, has diminished the need to seek merits of scale through integrated
planning and construction [and] there is a need for the invigoration of
Japan's telecommunications business and greater stress on internationally
competitive interfacing.
Id. at 380.
101 See HILLs, supra note 74, at 143.
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free of the "no-strike" clauses imposed on members of the Japanese
civil service and would also permit wage levels to be set without regard
to retaining parity with other ailing business which may be run by the
government, such as the JNR.1 02 On the other hand, privatization ex-
posed NTT and its employees to the "risks" of competition. 0" As such,
if NTT was actually going to become a private company, employees
wanted to participate as co-owners of the business and were in agree-
ment with NTT management that ministerial control over the "new"
company's activities, at least beyond basic telephone tariffs and the re-
quirements that were to be established regarding the provision of uni-
versal service, 0 should be minimized, leaving decisions by NTfT to
enter into any new business area to the discretion and commercial acu-
men of NTT.1 °3
However, fear among the members of the ruling LDP, particu-
larly those members from the rural areas, regarding the uncertainties of
a wholesale "break-up" of NTT, ultimately led to a shift in position
toward a restructuring without a "break-up," at least in the near
term.
10 6
102 See id. In 1983, the Government had frozen the pay award of NTT employ-
ees, presumably to maintain parity with wage levels paid to employees of other public
corporations, such as the railway workers. Id.
103 Id. Just how large those "risks" might be in relation to the "status quo" ap-
peared to be subject to some debate. As noted above, supra note 90, NTT already had
announced plans to reduce its workforce by almost 30% over the next 15 years. NTT
was also being criticized for rising personnel costs and the short working week (thirty-
seven hours ten minutes) in relation to the manufacturing industry. Id. at 142. Since
Zendentsu was a "company" union, privatization provided a good opportunity for the
union to maintain its strength within the trade union movement, since NTT's ability to
provide new services would allow it to redeploy, rather than layoff, existing union
members and to add new employees as well. Id. at 144. NTT management intended to
assure workers of job security by expanding NTT's scope of business and adopting a
flexible investment policy to establish new enterprises within the new NTT structure.
Also, through effective staff employment and reduction in the number of workers de-
pendent on revenue from the use of communication lines, NTT hoped to lower overall
personnel and other costs. Shinto, supra note 43, at 383.
11" Zendentsu did favor a continuation of NTT's obligations to provide universal
service and was opposed to the unconditional entry of new competitors. See HILLS,
supra note 74, at 144.
105 See id.
100 Id. Since MITI had primary responsibility for managing large-scale research
and development projects and for directing Japan's export-driven economic policies, it
had a strong interest in the possibilities created by the growing competence of Japanese
firms in the telecommunications area. In particular, MITI was successful in pushing
for the implementation of national policies based on pursuing technical advantage in
the areas of information systems. These aspirations, as well as the interests of those
firms which were denied access to the NTT family, such as Toshiba and Mitsubishi
Electric, led to a groundswell of interest in bringing some form of liberalization to the
telecommunications industry. Harris, supra note 43, at 11. At the time, MITI's au-
thority was under a good deal of pressure, both from changes in the domestic environ-
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Among the ministries, the reaction was mixed. MPT was initially
hostile to the proposals; however, changes in personnel at MPT ulti-
mately led to a belief that some form of reorganization would allow
MPT to reestablish some authority against MITI, which had always
held greater "prestige," and against NTT itself under whatever form of
regulation was to be imposed on the new entity.1"" From MITI's per-
spective, the best result would have been a complete privatization and
"break-up" of NTT, since such a policy would have placed telecommu-
nications and data processing completely outside of the scope of MPT
and into the "free market," where MITI would then be able to exercise
its traditional role in guiding domestic and international competition. 08
In summary, the various constituencies seemed to be settling upon
an imperfect compromise, one in which each of the parties realized
some, but not all, of their objectives. Among the items which appeared
to be necessary in any form of legislation on the subject were (1) a
sufficient amount of deregulation to permit large companies to mount
competitive efforts in the growing market for information and data
processing services, if for no other reason than to permit the develop-
ment of private networks, 09 (2) a commitment that NTT would be
ment and from international factors. At home, the liberalization of the domestic finan-
cial and monetary system, as well as the growing ability of the large firms to operate in
international export markets without assistance from the government, had crippled
many of MITI's own traditional tools for guiding industrial policy. From abroad, the
United States and other Western countries were pressuring MITI to abandon its poli-
cies of protecting domestic markets by threatening to impose protective barriers of their
own. As such, MITI was forced to become an advocate of liberalizing domestic markets
in order to insure that export markets remained open for Japanese goods. See HILLS,
supra note 74, at 142. Telecommunications came under the jurisdiction of the MPT
while MITI exercised control over the computer and data processing industries. In
referring to such systems, the MPT was careful to call them "data communications
systems" while MITI referred to them as "online information processing systems." The
conflict between the two ministries was evidenced by MITI's objection to the creation
of a new communications policy bill within the MPT and to the naming of the bill's
technological development planning section. In addition to its struggles with the MPT,
MITI was also engaged in conflicts with the Agency of Cultural Affairs over whether
or not computer programs ought to be protected under copyright laws, as advocated by
the Agency of Cultural Affairs, or made the subject of a new law which would better
suit the autonomy required by MITI. See Toshio, supra note 71, at 388.
107 Id. at 142.
I8 See HILLS, supra note 74, at 144. Zendentsu was particularly effective in con-
vincing rural members of the LDP, who held a dominant position in the Diet, that any
"break-up" into regional operating companies would have an adverse effect on rural
telephone services. As such, the LDP became convinced that the "break-up" strategy
should be abandoned and that the final proposal should include a commitment to keep
local tariffs steady. See id.
100 Concerns remained that NTT's size would allow it to cross-subsidize activities
in the information services area, thereby making it very difficult and expensive for new
competitors to enter the market. Obviously, some form of "break-up" would have had
the effect of alleviating these concerns; however, as a middle ground NTT's data com-
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required to continue to provide some form of basic services, even though
it was recognized that cross-subsidization would continue, (3) a morato-
rium on any full "break-up" of NTT for at least five years, (4) contin-
ued ministerial control over tariffs and market entry, although the de-
gree of control which might be exercised by the MPT was somewhat
uncertain and (5) some accommodation of the desire of the unions to
obtain the partial benefits of some form of strike clause as well as as-
surances of redeployment.
Following the lively debate in Fall 1983 and early 1984, three
bills were submitted to the Diet for consideration in April 1984.110 The
legislation included the following elements:
1. NTT would be privatized but it would not be "broken-up" into
regional operating companies or into functional divisions. Review of the
organizational structure would occur after five years, at which time a
"break-up" could once again be considered. u
2. Strikes would be limited to 15 days, a setback for Zendentsu.
However, since NTT would not be forbidden from doing such things
as manufacturing new equipment, the trade unions could reasonably
believe that new jobs could be found for NTT's existing employees,
thereby reducing the danger that the union would lose members as a
result of the restructuring.112
3. MPT would control NTT's entry into new services, as well as
the level of tariffs.113 Competition would be permitted in local net-
works, as well as on long-distance lines, although NTT and its compet-
itors would be subject to regulation by the MPT.1 4
Allowing for regulatory control of NTT by the MPT seemed to be
an attempt at achieving some sort of compromise between those constit-
uencies, including MITI, some members in Keidanren and the Com-
mission, which favored a full "break-up" of NTT and those groups
who favored the continuation of NTT as a public corporation or, at the
very least, a private corporation with a monopoly in various telephone
and telegraph services.11 However, the degree of control that was to be
munications division was reorganized as a separate corporation, the NTT Data Com-
munications System Corporation, in 1988. Nambu, supra note 53, at 151.
110 One bill would privatize NTT, one bill would liberalize regulation of the tele-
communications market (the "Telecommunications Business Law") and the other bill
would modify almost 100 other laws which would be affected by the structural changes
contained in the first two bills. Harris, supra note 43, at 14.
111 See HILLs, supra note 74, at 144.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 144-45. The Commission had originally recommended that competition
only be permitted on long-distance lines. Id. at 144.
115 Id.
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vested in the MPT, as well as the limits on strikes, led to initial opposi-
tion by Zendentsu, which proceeded to align itself in the debates within
the Diet with the opposition Socialist and Communist parties. 116 For
their part, manufacturers of telephone equipment also became con-
cerned about the legislation, fearing that NTT would begin manufac-
turing in direct competition with the manufacturers.
117
Throughout the summer of 1984, the various groups mulled over a
number of compromises. MPT's control over new services was eased
and although the prohibition on strikes during a period of forced arbi-
tration was retained, agreement was reaclied that the issue would be
reviewed in three years. 18 With these concessions in hand, Zendentsu,
eager to be viewed as a "responsible" trade union and willing to return
another day to address the "no strike" issue, reversed its position and
came out in favor of immediate passage of the bill in September
1984." The concerns of the manufacturers were assuaged by NTT's
undertaking not to manufacture equipment for the "time being," which
satisfied the manufacturers that NTT would not be competing with
them for a long time."20
As between the two ministries, MITI continued to show its con-
cerns regarding the MPT's apparent victory in retaining control over
the "liberalized" telecommunications industry, including data networks.
The major area of conflict had to do with the terms of entry of foreign
enterprises into competition with NTT, since MITI was under increas-
ing pressure from the United States to ease any restrictions on the abil-
ity of American firms to enter the market. The ministries debated the
definition of what would constitute a "foreign enterprise," 1 ' as well as
whether companies seeking entry as VAN's would be subject to prior
approval or would merely have to "register" with MPT.121 Ultimately,
116 Id. at 145.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. Manufacturers came to believe that NTT would be so preoccupied with
other aspects of the privatization process that it would be unwilling to immediately
undertake the expenses associated with manufacturing activities. See id.
121 The original MPT definition was that 50% Japan ownership was.required to
qualify as "domestic," and that only such "domestic" firms would be permitted to enter
into the common carrier business. The Americans opposed any such definition, seeking
full access for foreign firms. See id. at 146.
122 Id. at 146-47. The Americans also had concerns about the imposition of equip-
ment standards on firms seeking a license to provide VAN services. Prior to privatiza-
tion, NTT was responsible for setting and adjudicating standards and the MPT origi-
nally proposed that after privatization a board should be established consisting of
representatives of manufacturers. The Americans, with some support from MITI, ar-
gued that such a board would be inherently biased against foreign manufacturers and,
after some argument, an independent board was established and standard specifications
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a compromise was reached that allowed companies with 30% Japanese
capital to provide the "basic voice" services which would compete di-
rectly with NTT and the MPT's licensing authority would be limited
to the large-scale networking sector. 12  However, the Americans were
still dissatisfied in that foreigners were to be precluded from owning
any shares in NTT.2
Within the LDP, the legislation had become part of the inter-
party maneuvering surrounding the re-election of Prime Minister
Nakasone to the leadership of the party. 12 5 Any failure to pass the tele-
communications bills, which had become a vital part of Nakasone's ef-
forts to privatize the nation's public corporations, could be seen as a
serious blow to his reputation within the party. As such, it was not
until after the leadership election at the end of December 1984 that the
amended laws were finally passed, with the bills taking effect in April
1985.126
3.3. The Final Legislation
The Telecommunications Business Law ("TBL").27 transformed
the regulatory structure governing the telecommunications industry in
Japan by adopting the following elements:
1. Participants would be segregated into two major categories:
Type I carriers, which would own and operate their own telecommuni-
cations facilities, and Type II carriers, which did not own their facili-
ties but leased their circuits from Type I carriers in order to provide
various "value added" services1 28 Type II carriers were further divided
were reduced in order to make it easier for foreign firms. See id. at 150-51.
123 Id. at 147.
124 Id. at 146.
125 Id. at 145-46.
128 Id. Article 1 of the Supplementary Provisions of the New NTT Law provided
that its provisions would come into force "as from April 1, 1985." New NTT Law
Supp. Prov. Art 1 in 2 COMMUNICATIONS STUDY GROUP, JAPANESE LEGISLATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1984.
127 Telecommunications Business Law in 1 COMMUNICATIONS STUDY GROUP,
JAPANESE LEGISLATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1987) (Unofficial translation).
Article 1 of the TBL provides as follows:
The purpose of this Law is, considering the public nature of telecommuni-
cations business, by ensuring the proper and reasonable operation of such
business, to secure the consistent provision of telecommunications service,
to protect the interests of its users, and thereby to ensure both the sound
development of telecommunications and the convenience of the people, and
to promote the welfare of the public.
128 Harris, supra note 43, at 17. Article 6 of the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Types of telecommunications business shall be categorized into Type I
telecommunications business and Type II telecommunications business.
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into "Special Type II" carriers, which offered large-scale network ser-
vices (more than 500 circuits) nationally or internationally, and "Gen-
eral Type II" carriers, which offered size-limited network services."2 9
2. Type I carriers could offer local exchange and/or interexchange
services and, as mentioned above, could lease circuits to Type II carri-
ers.'30 Type I carriers could also provide all of the services a Type II
carrier was permitted to provide, including basic voice, data, facsimile,
telex and VAN services."' 1 Type II carriers could not simply resell
transmission or message services.
132
3. Type I carriers, including NTT, were subject to strict regula-
tion by MPT. Entry required the prior approval of MPT; tariffs and
changes in tariffs, including rates and other terms and conditions, re-
quired authorization by MPT;13 3 and foreign ownership of Type I car-
(2) Type I telecommunications business shall be that business which pro-
vides telecommunications service by establishing telecommunications cir-
cuit facilities (which mean transmission line facilities connecting transmit-
ting points with receiving points, switching facilities installed as
inseparable units therefrom, and other facilities accessory to such facilities,
the same shall apply hereinafter).
(3) Type II telecommunications business shall be any other telecommuni-
cations business than Type I telecommunications business.
129 Id. Article 21 of the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Type II telecommunications business shall be classified into General
Type II telecommunications business and Special Type II telecommunica-
tions business.
(2) General Type II telecommunications business shall be any other Type
II telecommunications business than Special Type II telecommunications
business.
(3) Special Type II telecommunications business shall be Type II telecom-
munications business which provides for the use of communications of
many and unspecific persons telecommunications facilities which exceed in
scale the standards stipulated, in terms of the capacity for accommodating
telecommunications lines, in the applicable cabinet ordinance, or Type II
telecommunications business which provides telecommunications facilities
designed for communications between Japan and foreign points for the use
of communications of others.
130 Id. Inter-urban trunk routes with high profitability were expected to be the
initial target of new entrants into the Type I carrier business. Such carriers will be able
to take advantage of optical fiber, microwave and other new technologies and would
rely on existing facilities, such as channels along the railway tracks, expressways and
power transmission cables. In addition, it was anticipated that some carriers would use
communications satellites to provide service due to the anticipated decreases in costs of
hardware and launching, as well as the increased capacity of satellite transmissions.
Shinto, supra note 43, at 381.
ISI Harris, supra note 43, at 17.
132 Id.
"I Article 9 of the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Any person who intends to operate Type I telecommunications busi-
ness shall obtain permission therefor from the Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications.
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riers was limited to one-third,' 34 except for NTT, in which foreign
(2) Any person who intends to obtain permission under the preceding par-
agraph shall, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable ordinance
of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, file with the Minister
of Posts and Telecommunications an application which describes the fol-
lowing matters:
i) Name and address of the applicant and in the case of a juridical
person, name of the representative.
ii) Category of telecommunications service according to the classifi-
cations stipulated in the applicable ordinance of the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications, and provisioning descriptions of
such service.
iii) Service territory.
iv) Outline of telecommunications facilities.
(3) A business plan and any other documents specified in the applicable
ordinance of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications shall be at-
tached to the application referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Article 10 of the TBL provides as follows:
The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications shall grant permission
under the paragraph (1) of the preceding Article if he determines that an
application for permission under the same paragraph conforms to each of
the following items:
i) Telecommunications service to be provided by the telecommuni-
cations carrier shall be appropriate in the light of the demand in the
service territory.
ii) The introduction of the telecommunications business shall not
result in a significant excess of telecommunications circuit facilities
to be used for such business in all or in any part of the territory or
route to be covered by the telecommunications carrier.
iii) The applicant shall have an adequate financial basis and tech-
nical capability to properly perform his or her telecommunications
business.
iv) The plan of the telecommunications business shall be reliable
and feasible.
v) In addition, the introduction of the telecommunications business
shall be appropriate for the sound development of telecommunica-
tions in general.
13 Article 11 of the TBL provides that the Minister of Posts and Telecommuni-
cations shall, regardless of the provisions of the preceding Articles, not grant permission
under Article 9 paragraph (1) to those persons who fall under any of the following
items:
iv) Any person who does not have Japanese nationality.
v) Any foreign government or its representative.
vi) Any foreign juridical person or association.
vii) Any juridical person or association which is represented by any per-
son or body set forth in the preceding three items, or one third or more of
whose officers are such persons, or one third of whose total voting rights is
exceeded by the aggregate of voting rights directly held by such persons or
bodies and voting rights calculated in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable ordinance of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications,
which is indirectly controlled by such persons or bodies through any other
juridical person or association.
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ownership was prohibited."3 5 Special Type II carriers must register
with MPT and notify MPT of their tariffs,1"6 while General Type II
carriers must simply notify MPT of their existence without the need to
provide supplemental notification of tariffs.
137
135 Harris, supra note 43, at 17. Article 4 of the New NTT Law provides as
follows:
(1) The shares of the Company shall be registered ones and may be pos-
sessed only by the Government, local public entities, Japanese nationals,
or Japanese juridical persons half the number or more of whose members,
shareholders or executive officers are not; or half of the amount or more of
whose capital or contribution is not owned by; or the majority of whose
voting rights do not belong to foreign nationals or foreign juridical
persons.
(2) The Government shall always hold one-third or more of the total
number of the outstanding shares of the Company.
(3) The Company shall obtain authorization from the Minister of Posts
and Telecommunications in order to issue new shares. The same shall
apply to the issuance of convertible debentures or debentures with pre-
emptive rights to take new shares.
136 Article 24 of the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Any person who intends to operate Special Type II telecommunica-
tions business shall obtain registration form the Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications.
(2) Any person who intends to obtain registration under the preceding
paragraph shall, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable ordi-
nance of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, file with the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications an application which describes
the following matters:
i) Name and address of the applicant and in the case of a juridical
person, name of the representative.
ii) Category of telecommunications service according to the classifi-
cation stipulated in the applicable ordinance of the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications, and a provisioning description of
such service.
iii) Outline of telecommunications facilities.
(3) A business plan and any other documents specified in the applicable
ordinance of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications shall be at-
tached to the application referred to in the preceding paragraph.
111 Harris, supra note 43, at 18. Article 22 of the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Any person who intends to operate General Type II telecommunica-
tions business shall, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable
ordinance of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, submit a no-
tification to that effect to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications
with documents which describe the following matters:
i) Name and address of the applicant and in the case of a juridical
person, name of the representative.
ii) Category of telecommunications service according to the classifi-
cation stipulated in the applicable ordinance of the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications and a provisioning description of
such service.
(2) Any person who has submitted a notification referred to in the preced-
ing paragraph (hereinafter referred to as a "General Type II telecommu-
nications carrier") shall, where any of the matters specified in item 1) of
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
4. Since the proposed reforms to the telecommunications system in
Japan were based on then-current projections of future growth areas,
the Telecommunications Business Bill provided for a review within
three years."38
While the "new" NTT was ultimately to become a private corpo-
ration upon the sale of up to two-thirds of its shares to the public,1 9
the MPT retained a good deal of discretion under the New NTT Law
regarding operational and business matters of the firm,140 including the
following:
1. NTT was to retain its existing structure for at least five years,
although the New NTT Law specifically provided for further review of
the situation within five years after the date of incorporation of the new
company (i.e., by the end of March 1990).
14 1
2. The MPT must authorize any issuance of new shares, includ-
ing the issuance of debentures or convertible debentures with the pre-
emptive right to subscribe for new shares.142 For its part, any decision
to dispose of shares owned by the government must be within the limi-
the same paragraph has been changed, submit without delay a notification
to that effect to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.
(3) A General Type II telecommunications carrier shall, before it changes
any of the matters specified in paragraph (1) item (ii) above, submit a
notification to that effect to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions. This shall not apply, however, to such minor changes as specified in
the applicable ordinance of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications.
1.8 Article 2 of the Supplementary Provision to the TBL provides as follows:
"The government shall, within three years from the date of the enforcement of this
Law, review the situation under which this Law is executed and shall take necessary
measures based upon the conclusion of the review."
"I Item (2) of Article 4 of the New NTT Law provided that "The Government
shall always hold one-third or more of the total number of the outstanding shares of the
[Company]."
1'0 Article 15 of the New NTT Law provides as follows:
(1) The Company shall be placed under supervision of the Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications in accordance with the provisions of this
Law.
(2) The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications may, if he determines
it to be especially necessary in enforcing this Law, issue to the Company
orders necessary for the supervision with respect to its business activities.
141 Article 2 of the Supplementary Provisions of the New NTT Law provided as
follows:
The Government shall, within five years after the date of the incorpora-
tion of the Company, review the nature of the Company, taking into ac-
count the situation under which this Law is enforced and changes in cir-
cumstances after the enforcement of this Law, etc., and shall take
necessary measures based upon the conclusion of the review.
142 New NTT Law Art. 4(3). Article 17 of the New NTT Law requires that the
MPT consult with the MOF prior to taking any action under Item (3) of Article 4.
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tation on the number of shares decided by the Diet in the relevant an-
nual budget.14
3. NTT would be free to invite subscription for new debentures,
provided that the amount of debentures was not to exceed four times as
much as the smaller amount of either the total sum of its capital and
reserved fund or the existing net assets of the company as shown in its
latest balance sheet.
1 44
4. The MPT must authorize the appointment or dismissal of exec-
utive officers and auditors of NTT,1 45 as well as any attempt to change
the articles of incorporation, dispose of profits, merge or dissolve the
company' 46 or transfer or mortgage its trunk lines or any other impor-
tant telecommunications facilities.
1 47
5. NTT was to formulate a business plan for each fiscal year for
submission to, and approval by, the MPT.1 48 Also, NTT was to submit
financial statements to the MPT within three months following the end
of each fiscal year.
149
3.4. NTT and Japanese Telecommunications After Deregulation
After privatization and liberalization, NTT remained in a domi-
nant market position, with the ability to provide both Type I and Type
II services."1 However, although NTT was technically a private com-
143 New NTT Law Art. 5.
144 New NTT Law Art. 7.
"I" New NTT Law Art. 9.
146 New NTT Law Art. 10.
147 New NTT Law Art. 13. Article 17 of the New NTT Law provides that the
MPT must consult with the MOF before taking any action under Article 13.
146 New NTT Law Art. 11. Article 17 of the New NTT Law provides that the
MPT must consult with the MOF before taking any action under Article 11.
14' New NTT Law Art. 12.
160 Article 4 of the Supplementary Provisions to the TBL provides as follows:
(1) Any business which relates to the public telecommunications activities
being actually conducted by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corporation before the dissolution (hereinafter referred to as "the Ex-Cor-
poration") at the time of enforcement of this Law and falls or is deemed to
fall under Type I telecommunications business shall be deemed to be the
business of which Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (herein-
after referred to as "NTT") has obtained permission under Article 9 par-
agraph (1) on the day of enforcement of this Law (hereinafter referred to
as "the enforcement day").
(2) Any business which relates to the public telecommunications activities
being actually conducted by Kikusai Denshin Denwa Company, Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as "KDD") at the time of enforcement of this Law
and falls or is deemed to fall under Type I telecommunications business
shall be deemed to be the business of which KDD has obtained permission
under Article 9 paragraph (1) on the enforcement day.
(3) Both NTT and KDD shall, within one month of the enforcement day,
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pany, it was still obligated to supply universal and equitable service as
if it were a public monopoly151 and, as such, NTT was required to
cross-subsidize "deficit" services as a public utility if MPT set tariffs
below the level of costs for such services. 152 NTT was also required to
continue to promote its basic research activities in telecommunications
technology and to insure that the results thereof were circulated in a
manner which promoted the "interests" of the public."'
A most significant, and somewhat controversial, element of the
TBL was the discretion granted MPT with respect to authorizing the
level of competition among NTT and new Type I carriers.15' As it
submit a notification on the matters specified in the applicable ordinance
of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications with respect to the busi-
ness stipulated in the preceding two paragraphs to the Minister of Posts
and Telecommunications.
"I HILLS, supra note 74, at 147. Article 2 of the New NTT Law provides as
follows:
The Company shall, in managing its business referred to in the preceding
Article, give consideration to the maintenance of its proper and efficient
management and shall contribute to the securement of provision of stable
nationwide telephone services throughout Japan by providing such services
indispensable to the people's life at appropriate conditions and impartially.
In a addition, the Company shall endeavor, in view of the importance of
the role which telecommunications will play in the future progress of soci-
ety and economy, to contribute to the creative advancement and develop-
ment of telecommunications in Japan through promoting its basic research
and development activities in telecommunications technology and through
disseminating the results thereof, and thereby to promote the interests of
the public.
152 Nambu, supra note 53, at 150-1. The legislation actually provided that 10 yen
would remain the unit for pricing, meaning that while NTT could possibly alter the
time and distance allowed for the unit price, it could not increase the local telephone
call tariffs. HILLS, supra note 74, at 147. Therefore, NTT would not be able to protect
its revenue from local services by increasing costs of local calls significantly. Id. The
introduction of competition in the long-distance market may ultimately make it very
difficult for NTT to continue to cross-subsidize local services, particularly if competi-
tors are permitted to charge lower rates than NTT and NTT is not allowed to adopt
"cost-based" pricing for its services. Commentators have noted that NTT's revenue
structure is inherently unstable, since about 30% of its revenues from telephone calls in
the late 1980's came from just three percent (3%) of its total subscribers. Id. at 156.
' New NTT Law Art. 2.
'N The regulations are similar to the kind often applied to the public utilities.
One is the "demand and supply adjustment clause," by which the MPT can regulate
the rate of entry to avoid purportedly ruinous competition. The rate level and rate
structure of telecommunications services are subject to MPT regulation based on tradi-
tional rate-of-return principles. According to the new tariff accounting rule, all rates of
services must be based on the fully distributed cost. Fair rate of return is to be calcu-
lated based on the average rate of return of the major industrial sector. Nambu, supra
note 53, at 150. Clearly, MPT was a major "winner" from the deregulation of NTT.
According to one source, the MPT "gained such wind-fall power over telecommunica-
tions as it never dreamed of . . ." HILLS, supra note 74, at 152.
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turned out, MPT was willing to authorize several new entrants, "5 in-
cluding three firms, sometimes referred to as the "New Common Carri-
ers," or "NCCs," Japan Telecom Company, Teleway Japan Corpora-
tion and Daini-Denden Inc., " 6 which began supplying private-line
services in the large and profitable Tokyo-Osaka market in 1986 and
followed with public telephone services in 1987.'15 Another firm, To-
kyo Telecommunications Network, provided local services in the Kanto
District, 5 ' and several other firms were established to provide regional
leased services and satellite communications."
Literally hundreds of firms entered the rapidly growing Type II
services markets, offering a wide range of services and business applica-
tions.' 60 Special Type II carriers, of which there were 17 by July 1988,
155 A list of the new Type I carriers, as of July 1988, appears in Harris, supra
note 43, at 24.
15 As Harris explained:
Daini Denden ... hoped to be the "second telephone company" (the En-
glish translation of its company name) . . .[however] other would-be en-
trants eagerly sought authorization as well, including Japan Telecom and
Teleway Japan. Keidanren expended considerable effort to arrange a
"consolidation" of these entrants into a single competitor to NTT, on the
grounds that one company could offer stronger competition than several.
The political [and financial] backing of the several entrants would not be
denied and each began to offer Type I services over an area that encom-
passes a majority of the Japanese population. The origins of these new
common carriers (NCCs) is illustrative of the Japanese style of collective
business organization. An initiative of the Public Highway Corporation,
Teleway Japan is owned by Toyota, Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui & Co. and
Sumitomo Corp., among others. It has an optical cable network laid along
the highways linking Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. Japan Telecom was or-
ganized by JNR, but also has nearly 300 corporations as its owners.
While not contractually required, it is expected that the corporate owners
of each of the NCCs will purchase some services from that carrier.
Harris, supra note 43, at 18-19.
157 Nambu, supra note 53, at 50.
15 The Tokyo Telecommunications Network is a subsidiary of the electric utility
monopoly in the Kanto District (the Tokyo Denryoku Corporation). Id. at 150.
15 A number of domestic and foreign organizations gave consideration to compet-
ing with NTT through the use of satellite transmissions. The concept created further
tensions between the United States, which had a technical advantage and brought some
degree of pressure to bear upon Japan to reduce the balance of payments deficit be-
tween the two countries by purchasing any new satellites from the United States, and
the MPT, which had a policy of delaying the further use of communications satellites
until the launch of a Japanese satellite in 1990. Ultimately, Japan agreed to allow
NTT's private competitors to purchase satellites from the United States and three new
ventures were formed to provide new services utilizing satellites. However, serious
doubts existed as to whether or not one, let alone three, satellite competitors could
provide services in Japan on a cost-effective basis. Hsus, supra note 74, at 148-50.
160 MPT estimated that the market for Type II services was almost $3.4 billion.
Nambu, supra note 53, at 151. Information regarding the characteristics of the 452
new General Type II carriers (as of July 1988), including the location of their main
offices, type of business previously engaged in, types of services and business applica-
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included IBM, AT&T and most of the leading computer and commu-
nications firms in Japan.161 In fact, one of the major players in the
VAN market was Nippon Information and Communications Corpora-
tion, a joint venture between NTT and IBM.162 NTT's agreement to
enter the VAN market with IBM using NTT's data network and
IBM's computers was vigorously opposed by the two largest equipment
manufacturers in Japan, Fujitsu and Hitatchi, since the proposed VAN
allowed IBM to use NTT's local offices to sell its hardware. Although
competitors argued that such a relationship would not be permitted
under American antitrust laws, the MPT did not oppose the proposal,
noting that to do so would only exacerbate trade tensions with the
United States.
In addition to the aforementioned changes in the telecommunica-
tions area a number of interesting developments occurred with respect
to cable television ("CATV"), particularly since the MPT approved
the limited operation. of two-way cable systems in May 1984. However,
although a number of companies have undertaken construction of
CATV services, their profitability has yet to be proven. Construction of
facilities has been expensive due to the high cost of land and compli-
cated regulations may further increase the costs. Moreover, a good deal
of uncertainty exists as to whether or not consumers will be willing to
pay the extra money for cable services.
16 3
As competition grew in the basic telecommunications area, NTT
responded by aggressively moving into a number of related business
areas,1 64 as well as by making significant investments designed to up-
tions, appears in Harris, supra note 43, at 27-28. The "typical" General Type II
carrier was located in Tokyo or Osaka, was previously engaged in information commu-
nication processing, offered data and/or voice transmission and focuses on transmission
and exchange of order data between retailers and wholesalers. Other significant appli-
cations included voice mail and electric mail. "As of ... October [1989], more than
780 companies had entered the Type II telecom business. Of the total, 27 were special
Type II telecom businesses." Makiura, Unanswered Questions, 1 J. JAPANESE TRADE
& INDUS., 28 (1990). It was anticipated that the annual growth rate of the market for
Type I businesses from 1988 to 1992 was 7.3% while the market for information ser-
vices increased 21.5% and VAN increased 23.1%. During that same period, the market
for CATV increased 72.9%. Hasegawa, Satellite Age, 1 J. JAPANESE TRADE & INDUS.
29 (1990).
161 For a list of the 17 Special Type II carriers (as of July 1988), including loca-
tion, types of services offered (e.g., voice, video, data or integrated) and service area, see
Harris, supra note 43, at 25-6.
182 Id. at 19-20; HILLS, supra note 74, at 151.
1"I See Toshio, supra note 71, at 386-87, for a brief summary of the evolution of
the CATV service industry in Japan.
18 As of July 1988, NTT had created nearly 100 new subsidiaries or affiliated
companies and joint ventures since its privatization, including many lines of business
from which the RBOCs in the United States would be restricted. Among the operations
to be conducted by the subsidiaries were design of data communications systems; basic
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/5
PR1VATIZATION
grade its infrastructure and fully digitize its network.165 "While not
directly engaged in equipment manufacturing, NTT has aggressively
expanded its equipment research, development and design activities." '
Moreover, NTT's pursuit of the ISN concept resulted in the introduc-
tion of basic service on a commercial basis in April 1988, with primary
service to follow during the next year, and it is anticipated that pricing
of ISN services will provide substantial savings over existing services,
especially at long distances. 
1 7
The early results on the competitive effect of deregulation are
somewhat mixed. For their part, the NCCs have been able to achieve
very rapid growth due, in part, to the MPT's tariff and access policies,
which maintained a sizable difference between the rates allowed for
NTT and the NCCs.'68 In fact, all three of the NCCs posted net prof-
its in the FY ended March 31, 1990.169 However, despite NTT's
claims that the MPT's policies are impairing its ability to attract new
business, 1' NTT retains an overwhelming portion of the market share
for Type I services and, in the FY ended March 31, 1990, recorded
sales nearly sixty times greater than the largest of the NCCs.
1 17
As for Type II services, the financial and technical strengths of
software development; sales of PC application systems; overseas engineering, sales, in-
stallation, operations and consultation; design and operation of VAN systems (joint
venture with IBM); telemarketing; real estate; credit card services; overseas financing;
leasing of terminal equipment; leasing of cars and trucks and health promotion activi-
ties. In 1985, NTT entered into an agreement with AT&T to exchange product devel-
opment, marketing and management know-how. Id. The intention of the parties was to
develop a new generation of digital switching and a standardized computer protocol for
linking incompatible computers. HILLs, supra note 74, at 151. For a list of NTT's
newly-established affiliations as of July 1988, including the amount of capitalization
and description of operations, see Harris, supra note 43, at 29-31.
165 Harris, supra note 43, at 20.
16 Id. It should come as little surprise that NTT's massive procurement needs for
telephone equipment have led to allegations that the company abuses its position to
obtain favorable prices when purchasing from manufacturers. Nambu, supra note 53,
at 151.
167 Harris, supra note 43, at 20.
Is Id. at 19. In related matters, NTT's pricing flexibility was further impaired
by its inability to lower its long distance rates or raise its local rates. Id.
119 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 4. Now that the Type I carriers have
recovered their cumulative losses, it is anticipated that the thrust of competition against
NTT will shift from conventional price-cutting wars to contests for more diversified
services. Makiura, supra note 160, at 28. While Tokyo Telecommunication Network
Inc. has experienced markedly expanded sales, all regional MTCs, including Tokyo
Telecommunication Network, have suffered considerable losses and continue to face
difficult times in the future. Id. Two international MTCs, called second KDDs,
showed rapid growth following their startup in October 1989, and hold a combined
market share of 30% as of the beginning of 1991. In response, KDD reduced its prices
and that set off a year of intense price competition. Id.
10 Harris, supra note 43, at 19.
171 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 4.
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Japanese electronics companies, as well as foreign firms such as IBM,
have resulted in significant competition for NTT, in spite of its inher-
ent advantages.17 2 MPT has assisted the efforts of the competiiors
through its open-information policy for format and interface stan-
dards.1 ' Predictably, however, deregulation and competition in this
area have spawned trade tensions between the United States and Ja-
pan, leading to tense, and seemingly continuous, negotiations regarding
the ability of foreign participants to operate in Japan's domestic market
and in competition with KDD. 74
From a financial perspective, NTT's performance since deregula-
tion reflects some of the displacement of the reorganization process. Op-
erating revenues rose by over five percent (5%) annually in each of FY
1986 and FY 1987; however, during the next two years growth slowed
to three percent (3%).175 Operating expenses increased significantly
during the same period,"e leading to fluctuations in operating income
and a disappointing FY 1989 performance during which operating in-
come actually fell below the comparable figure for FY 1985.177 Nonop-
erating performance actually improved over the period, yet remains a
small part of NTT's total picture,17 and the company's ability to man-
age its tax obligations resulted in fairly steady growth in net income
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 For example, negotiations which finally ended in August 1990 resulted in
some form of agreement as to steps that would be taken by the Japanese in order to
improve the competitive position of foreign suppliers of "network channel terminating
equipment," including access to NTT's technical specifications on an equal footing
with Japanese suppliers. Also, the approval process for foreign firms interested in oper-
ating VAN's was to be shortened from several months to a maximum of 30 days and
foreign VAN operators would be allowed to provide enhanced services from Japan to
the United States and other points overseas. Finally, KDD was called upon to elimi-
nate its surcharges of up to 20% which it had levied on foreign VAN companies that
leased international lines. JAPANESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTE. REPORT No. 31B at 9-10
(1990). Regarding various other issues surrounding attempts by foreign firms to enter
the Japanese telecommunications market following deregulation activities in 1985, see 6
Japan Lawletter Issue 1 (1987) at 38-41. Among the topics covered are joint ventures
by United States firms to enter the Type I carrier market, the mobile telephone market
and NTT procurement policies.
175 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 4-5. Telephone revenues accounted
for 84% of all operating revenues in FY 1985 and for 79% of all operating revenues in
FY 1988. Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 4-5. Operating revenues increased by 18% from FY 1985 to FY 1989,
while operating expenses jumped by over 23% during the same period. Id. at 5.
177 Id. at 4-5. Operating income for FY 1985 was 757 billion yen, while operating
income for FY 1989 was 705 billion yen. Operating income had peaked at 914 billion
yen for FY 1987. Id. at 5.
178 Id. at 5-6. Losses from nonoperational activities dropped from 384 billion yen
in FY 1985 to 195 billion yen in FY 1989. However, nonoperating revenues still only
accounted for just over one percent (1%) of the firm's total revenues. Id. at 5.
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after taxes.17 9 While NTT's assets have not grown significantly, man-
agement did succeed in reducing the firm's long-term debt and increas-
ing shareholder's equity. 80
3.5. Operational Future for NTT and the Industry
The New NTT Law called for an examination of the desirable
status of the company, and the implementation of any supplemental
measures necessary to combat any perceived problems, by March
1990.18' While it appeared that significant progress had been made in
permitting new competitors to enter the market for telecommunications
services, particularly in the Type II services area, NTT's continued
dominance in the marketplace had remained a concern for various con-
stituencies, as had management's inability to hold down the level of
expenses and improve services.18" Also, as noted below, NTT's priva-
tization program had gone from boom to bust, creating a significant
breach of confidence in the ability of the government and NTT execu-
tives to manage the newly-privatized entity. As such, analysts awaited
with great anticipation the recommendations of powerful interest
groups, and the actions of the LDP itself, with respect to the medium-
term structure of NTT.
In February 1990, the Keidanren's Committee on Information
Telecommunications Policy announced its view that NTT ought to take
further steps to insure competition and to increase efficiency and that
regulations pertaining to the telecommunications business generally
needed to be further reduced. 8" Specifically, the Committee felt that
fair competition would be significantly enhanced by the breakup of
NTT into local network operating bodies and other operations."8'
However, it was conceded that there was not sufficient managerial and
technological information available in order to assess the consequences
of such an action and it concluded that any judgment on whether to
reorganize NTT ought to be delayed until such information was avail-
able.'85 As such, the Committee recommended that detailed and specific
179 Id. at 5-6. Net income after taxes rose steadily from FY 1985 (185 billion yen)
to FY 1989 (274 billion yen). Id. at 5.
180 Id. at 5-6. The firm's asset value remained essentially unchanged during the
period from FY 1985 through FY 1989. Shareholders' equity increased by approxi-
mately 14% during the period. Id. at 5.
181 New NTT Law Supp. Prov. Art. 2.
182 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 6.
1'3 Watanabe, NTT and Japan Telecommunications System, 121 Keidanren Rev.
8, 9 (February 1990).
184 Id. at 8.
185 Id.
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studies be undertaken on the digitalization of networks, research and
development, charges for local calls, rights of shareholders and other
matters.186
Until the requisite studies could be completed, the Committee rec-
ommended that NTT take the following measures to enhance fair com-
petition and increase management efficiency:
[F]irst, the monopolistic local networks division and the
other competitive divisions should be clearly separated as in-
ternal organizations. Secondly, the accounting system should
be divided so that revenues and expenditures may be clearly
represented by type of services. Thirdly, the terms and con-
ditions of trade within NTT and those between NTT and
other telecommunications companies should be equalized. In
addition, information pertaining to competitive operators
should be managed properly so as to prevent its internal mis-
use. Aside from these internal measures, it is also necessary
for NTT to build open networks, disclose corporate informa-
tion and establish a nationwide digital network at an early
date.1
8 7
In summary, the Keidanren's constituencies remained dedicated to
reducing the competitive advantages which they felt accrued to NTT
due to its size and apparent ability to subsidize new activities with rev-
enues from its monopoly-type services. It was acknowledged that little
or no work had been done on analyzing the effect of an "AT&T-type"
break-up. In the interim, NTT was called upon to undertake a volun-
tary separation of certain of its activities and to facilitate the analysis of
its relationships by enhanced disclosure of financial and operational in-
formation. On the other hand, as the issue of break-up was considered,
NTT was to continue to pursue its "universal" service objectives.
In addition to the measures to be taken by NTT, the Committee
made additional recommendations regarding the overall process of de-
regulation of the telecommunications business, including the following:
1. The scope of governmental approval required for services to be
provided by Type I carriers such as NTT and new long-distance carri-
ers should be reduced. 88 For example, the Committee recommended
that approval be "confined to services having a close bearing on na-
tional life, such as pure telephone service. In addition, the operating
guidelines for the supply-demand adjustment clause in each field of ac-
188 Id.
187 Id. at 9.
188 Id.
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tivity should be publicly disclosed '" 9 and eased in parallel to private
competition.'"0
2. Type I carriers "should try to introduce a rational charge sys-
tem and allow voice connections from the public network to the private
circuits and then back to the public network in order to promote liber-
alization in the use of circuits and improve the charge systems. In addi-
tion, each carrier should make further efforts to introduce a discount
system for large users and expand the scope of nighttime and midnight
discounts." 191
3. The provisions in the existing laws that prohibit foreign stock
ownership as well as the clause in the new NTT Law obligating the
government to hold one-third of NTT stock, should be reexamined.'
1 92
Keidanren's recommendations focused on enhanced competition
and reduced rates for large users, both of which could be expected to
benefit its members. Taking into account the Committee's recommenda-
tions, the LDP proposed a revision to the NTT law in March 1990
which called for the following:
1. Internally dividing NTT's business into "long-distance
and regional communications operations and insuring com-
plete disclosure of information on revenues and expenditures,
2. Preparing disclosure and implementing a thorough ra-
tionalization program [by NTT] on a voluntary basis,
3. Considering recycling earnings to shareholders in the
form of larger dividends, 9 3
4. Carrying out the necessary deregulation measures, and
5. Conducting study of the desirable structure of NTT,
based on the above results, and in fiscal 1995 reaching a con-
clusion based on that study."1 94
Given an additional five years by the LDP to address outstanding
concerns over NTT services, as well as to restore the public's confi-
dence in the company and its shares, NTT can be expected to under-
take a number of programs designed to improve its co-local and long-
distance telephone businesses as well as the following additional
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
I" Increasing the dividend payout presumably would increase the attractiveness of
the NTT shares as an investment vehicle and restore the public confidence in NTT
and the Government's ability to insure that NTT shares were a safe investment for
individual shareholders.[Footnote added.]
194 Makiura, supra note 160, at 28.
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opportunities:.9
1. NTT can be expected to move forward rapidly with its plans to
provide INS. It is expected that the size of the information industry
will quadruple between 1986 and 2005 leading to an increase from
85.3 billion yen to 333.3 billion yen during that period. 96 "Digital
electronic media also are predicted to expand their share of the market.
Telecommunications and data processing will account for 70% of the
industry's income, up from the current 50%.'' 97 NTT anticipates that
it will be able to use "sophisticated image processing services to convey
high-definition images, high resolution text and graphics and, eventu-
ally three-dimensional images to individual users. . .[and] users will
be free to personalize their communications services, picking from a
wide range of options and tailoring them to meet individual
preferences."' 8
2. In order to implement its vision for INS, NTT is anticipated to
continue its strong commitment to research and development spending.
In fiscal year 1988, research and development expenditures jumped
22% to about $1.5 billion. 99 Fiscal year 1990 projections for research
and development were over $1.6 billion. 00 In addition to this applied
research, NTT will continue its basic research in order to accede to the
government's demands for more basic research as well as to provide
NTT with "entree to non-telecommunications fields, such as computer
software and medical/diagnostic equipment."'20 .
3. NTT is anticipated to continue its policies of broadening its
scope of services by establishing and funding specialized subsidiaries
outside of its core businesses. In addition, it will continue to establish
affiliated firms related to its core businesses of telecommunications con-
sulting, terminal equipment sales and information services. 2
As of this writing, the operational future of NTT is somewhat
hazy. Realizing that significant pressure is building to further deregu-
late the industry during the current decade, NTT decisionmakers ap-
pear to be embarking on a dynamic and costly program of basic and
applied research designed to provide it with some form of competitive
advantage by virtue of its INS product offerings. While real concern
does exist about the price level of NTT shares, it is unlikely that im-
195 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 7.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 8.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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provements in shareholder confidence will be a material objective, other
than as part of a broader effort on the part of the government to calm
investor fears in light of recent downturns in the Japanese securities
markets and disclosures of activity which can only be called "self-deal-
ing," without regard to its legality under Japanese laws.
3.6. International Telecommunications Services
NTT was not the only public corporation in Japan affected by the
call for deregulation in 1985. As noted above, until 1985 international
telecommunications services in Japan were provided by KDD, a mo-
nopoly "special private" corporation in which private investors had
held a majority stake since its founding in 1953.203 Although KDD was
certainly more "private" than NTT, the MPT has retained a good deal
of discretion regarding KDD's activities by virtue of its status as the
largest shareholder, almost 11%, and its ability to authorize KDD's op-
erating plans.2 °4 In the mid-1980's, the market for international tele-
communications was less than one-twentieth the size of the domestic
market; however, deregulation was expected to bring with it competi-
tion for KDD.205
Under the TBL, both NTT and KDD were authorized to con-
tinue their existing activities and were each designated as Type I carri-
ers with respect to their scope of business.20 6 While NTT could enter
the international market after deregulation, it was anticipated that the
major competition to KDD would come through the Special Type II
carriers. However, KDD still feared that NTT might enter the inter-
national market itself or agree to lease international lines to new Spe-
cial Type II carriers. As such, KDD concluded that it had best enter
the VAN business itself, thereby giving it a product to offer to the end
user.
20 7
Two companies, International Telecom Japan Inc. and Interna-
tional Digital Communications Inc., °8 set out to challenge KDD and
202 Id. The enacting legislation for KDD was the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Com-
pany, Ltd. Law (Law No. 301 of 1952, as amended) (the "KDD Law"), which was
amended at the time of deregulation by Law No. 87 of 1984.
204 Id.
203 Nambu, supra note 53, at 151-52.
206 TBL Supp. Prov. Art. 4.
207 HILLS, supra note 74, at 147-48. Although Article 1 of the KDD Law makes
it clear that the purpose of KDD is to supply international telecommunications ser-
vices, Article 2 of the KDD Law contemplates that KDD may enter into such other
business activities as may be incidental to its purpose.
20S JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 8. No foreign-owned competitors have
entered the field against KDD; however, International Digital Communications Inc. is
backed by Britain's Cable & Wireless Plc and Pacific Telesis International Inc. from
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"have provided leased circuit [and telephone] services to neighboring
Asian countries since . . . 1989."'29 Although the competitors are run-
ning significant deficits, particularly in light of the large start-up costs,
it is believed that they will be able to turn a profit in a few years.210
However, "KDD probably will continue to dominate the market even
though MPT's regulations call for KDD rates to be about 23% higher
than those of its rivals."'2 11 From a financial perspective, KDD has had
some difficulties with increasing operating costs, 21 2 although its overall
balance sheet outlook remains solid and the value of shareholders' eq-
uity has steadily improved.213
In light of the fact that KDD operates in a relatively narrow mar-
ket and because certain international telecommunications organizations
require that one organization be appointed as the national representa-
tive of the country, it is unlikely that any attempt will be made to
break-up KDD or its special relationship with the MPT relating to
international telecommunications issues.214 In the future, KDD will at-
tempt to improve its core operations, by adding new services, improving
existing services and developing and introducing new forms of technol-
ogy,21 5 and diversify into new forms of businesses which support its
activities in telecommunications and information processing
technologies.216
the United States, as well as by Toyota and C. Itoh & Co. Id.
209 Id:
210 Id.
211 Id. Although MPT's regulations called for KDD rates which were about 23%
higher than those charged by competitors, the MPT has allowed KDD to reduce its
rates under certain circumstances. Id.
212 Id. at 9-10. "KDD's net profits fluctuated even though its operating revenues
grew steadily, at least until FY 1989... KDD's management cited sharply rising costs
for marketing, customer service, equipment and research," particularly in FY 1989. Id.
at 9.
213 Id. at 9, 10.
214 Id. at 9. "For example, Intelsat, Inmarasat and the International Telecommu-
nications Union." Id.
215 Id. at 9, 11. For example, KDD will attempt to provide easier billing and
payment methods in order to keep existing corporate and individual customers. Also,
KDD will offer various packaged services for its corporate customers and expend addi-
tional amounts on new undersea fiber-optic cables to improve the quality and availabil-
ity of its services. With respect to new technologies, KDD is developing international
video conferencing, improved satellite systems and computerized network management
systems. Id.
216 Id. at 11. "New ventures include Kokusai Information Service Co., Ltd.,
which markets Japanese and foreign data base services; OSI Plus Corp., which devel-
ops software based on the Open Systems Interconnect standard; and KDD Technology
Corp., which seeks to spin off other products and services from KDD's telecommunica-
tions and information processing technologies." Id. at 11. Other subsidiaries conduct
marine surveys for submarine cables and other projects and manage and develop
KDD's real estate assets. Id.
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4. PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION OF AIRLINES, RAILWAYS,
AND TOBACCO
While deregulation of NTT and the subsequent offering of its se-
curities in the Japanese securities markets had the biggest impact on
everyday life and upon Japan's capital markets, Nakasone's original
plans also contemplated sweeping changes for at least three other major
public corporations by 1987. While the state-controlled airlines, rail-
ways, salt and tobacco companies did not, at least directly, have the
same sort of impact on government finances as the NTT offerings, the
apparent attempt to privatize the debt built up by these entities, as well
as corresponding deregulation designed to insure that the industry sec-
tors achieved some minimal form of competitiveness, is worth noting.
4.1. Airlines
Air transport policies in Japan, as in many countries, evidence the
tension between competitive efficiencies and national security and sov-
ereignty interests. Historically, air transport in Japan has been heavily
regulated; "scheduled airline services require[d] licenses and fare
changes [were] subject to prior approval by authorities.""' The growth
of domestic demand for air transport was relatively modest during the
early 1980s, at least in comparison to the United States and the United
Kingdom.218 However, as deregulation in the United States increased
competitive pressures in international air services and impending unifi-
cation in the EC led to the creation of larger continental carriers in the
aftermath of mergers between domestic airlines in the EC, Japan rec-
ognized the need for reform in its own system.
Until 1985, air transport in Japan was dominated by three major
domestic carriers, each of which serviced a different role in an adminis-
tratively-ordained system of market segmentation. JAL was the sole
scheduled international carrier and also was assigned domestic trunk
routes.21" All Nippon Airways ("ANA"), a private firm, handled do-
mestic flights and international charters and Japan Air System
("JAS") (formerly known as Towa Domestic Airlines) mainly operated
11 OECD Japan 1987/88, supra note 21, at 83.
218 Id. Domestic demand for air transport increased 11 per cent between 1980 and
1985 compared with 24 per cent in the United States and 25 per cent in the United
Kingdom. "The limitation of airport facilities, the availability of high-speed trains and
high air fares explain the limited demand. While unrestricted air fares were not very
different from comparable fares in most other countries . . .discount tickets are less
widely available" than in the United States. Id.
219 Id. at 84.
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local routes. 2 Severe restrictions made entry into the market by new
competitors very difficult and applications for licenses would be
changed if the prospective additional supply would execute existing de-
mand.22 Moreover, the then-existing structure effectively insulated
JAL from serious competition from ANA and JAS in the lucrative in-
ternational cargo area."'
In May 1985, Japan and the United States reached agreement on
a series of amendments to their 1952 bilateral civil aviation accord. 3
The amendments broke JAL's monopoly on international cargo services
by giving trans-Pacific rights to Nippon Cargo Airlines, allowed ANA
and JAS to gain scheduled international passenger service and in-
creased the number of foreign competitors in all segments of Japan's
domestic passenger and cargo markets.22 Moreover, pursuant to rec-
ommendations made in the Report of the Transport Policy Council to
the MOT in June 1986 (the "Transport Policy Council Report"),
competition in the domestic market was encouraged by opening up do-
mestic routes to additional companies.225
The Transport Policy Council Report included a recommendation
that the government divest itself of its remaining shares in JAL.226 In
September 1987, the Diet voted to abolish the Japan Air Lines Co.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 JEI REPORT No 32A, supra note 5, at 11. "International passenger competi-
tion between JAL and the two domestic carriers was limited to unscheduled charter
flights to a handful of foreign countries and domestic segments of JAL's international
routes. In addition, cargo carriers were restricted to domestic service." Id.
222 Id. at 11, 12.
224 Id. at 12.
225 OECDJapan 1987188, supra note 21, at 84. However, OECD criticized the
Japanese policies as falling short of comparable developments in the United States and
United Kingdom, noting that:
The Report of the Transport Policy Council indicates that Japanese de-
regulation for airlines essentially aims at flexible administrative guidance.
In particular, both entry and pricing remain administratively controlled by
the government. Also market segmentation remains virtually intact, with
JAL still serving almost all international routes and ANA most domestic
routes. Allowing an additional company to serve a route while maintain-
ing price controls merely replaces a monopoly with a duopoly (or with an
oligopoly) where competition on price is excluded by regulation, as is the
case for most intra-European routes. In the authorities' view, free compe-
tition in airlines is not appropriate in Japan because of the shortage of air
traffic capacities in Tokyo and Osaka, because of concern to maintain the
highest safety standards, and because of the objective of maintaining a na-
tion-wide network. Nevertheless, lower prices would stimulate demand
considerably. Better use of the 80 per cent of airports that face few, if any,
capacity constraints would allow bottlenecks to be avoided.
228 Id.
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/5
PRIVATIZATION
Law, which was otherwise scheduled to expire in November 1988, and
sold the remainder of its JAL shares, which amounted to a 34.5% in-
terest in the company, for $4.4 billion in November 1987.227 While
JAL was given complete control over its internal structure, it must still
submit its annual operating plan to the MOT for review and
approval.228
In Japan, entry, exit, transportation charges and similar matters
relating to the airlines industry are regulated through a variety of li-
censing, notification and authorization requirements. For example, air-
lines must apply for a license for each separate route and the applica-
tion will be reviewed in light of the appropriateness of the airline for
the route, its ability to service the route and handle the additional vol-
ume of business and overall supply and demand conditions.229 A tem-
porary lapse of service on a route requires permission from the authori-
ties, but a route may be permanently abandoned simply by affording
advance notice to the authorities.230 Fares, including discounts, must be
authorized and will be reviewed in light of the fair level of return and
the need to limit discriminatory pricing practices.
231
There was little doubt that JAL would remain a formidable
competitor following deregulation. It had a large fleet of planes,
a well-established network of overseas offices and, not unimportantly,
access to the domestic routes formerly reserved to ANA and JAS. 2 2
However, competition has also increased significantly since 1985,233
and the airline has been attempting to deal with a variety of prob-
lems, including labor issues, 2 4 management divisions and infight-
-11 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 12.
228 Id.
229 Uekusa, supra note 1, at 257. License applications must be accompanied by a
business plan which sets forth such things as the total number of aircraft, number of
flights and departure and arrival times. Any modifications to the plan must be author-
ized in advance. Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
222 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 12.
232 Id.
The level of competition in domestic and international service has in-
creased sharply since 1985. JAL now goes head-to-head with ANA and
JAS on most domestic routes. JAS returns the compliment to many Asian
destinations, and ANA is building its routes to the United States and Eu-
rope. At least seven American companies battle JAL for the booming
transpacific passenger and cargo business; numerous other foreign carriers
vie for rights to serve Japan.
Id.
224 Id.
Outsiders criticize JAL for having too many people in management and
administration, and not enough pilots, flight attendants and ground crews.
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ing2 35 and public concerns regarding safety that arose after the crash of
a jumbo jet on a domestic flight in 1985.2'3
A boom in overseas tourism, generated by the growing affluence of
the Japanese citizenry and programs devoted to increasing consumer
spending, as well as a strong volume of cargo business from export and
import trade, has allowed JAL to recover from losses suffered in FY
1985 and FY 1986 because of depressed passenger levels.23 7 Operating
revenues rose 13.3% in FY 1989 to just under $7.1 billion,23 ' although
profits decreased 4.4% to $10.5 million. 39 The dip in profitability re-
flects increases in the relative level of sales and advertising expendi-
tures,"4° as well as the funding of new equipment, both of which oc-
curred following privatization.241 JAL has also increased its financial
investments after the 1987 divestiture, a strategy designed to maximize
return on its financial assets.
242
Foreigners make up an important part of JAL's flight crews, particularly
as pilots. JAL is responding with improved training programs but service
expansion is likely to outpace the supply of pilots for some time.
Id.
235 Id. at 14.
At headquarters JAL has tried to reshuffle management to end internal
divisions and infighting. During JAL's long and intimate relationship
with the government, factions mirroring various bureaucratic interests
within the Ministry of Transportation developed and came into conflict
with groups representing other interests. A June 1989 reorganization of
the board of directors and subsequent personnel shifts, targeted at reduc-
ing MOT's influence on JAL, have yet to make a clear difference regard-
ing internal strife. Many airline analysts have questioned whether the
shift simply indicated that one faction had gained the upper hand for the
moment. While everyone agrees that infighting wastes energy and prevents
JAL from reacting quickly to new demands, no one has an immediate
solution.
Id.
238 Id. JAL's reputation for safety was damaged by the tragedy, even though the
crash was attributed to faulty bulkhead repairs by Boeing employees. JAL launched a
number of advertising programs emphasizing safety, which ultimately contributed to
restricting passenger loads to satisfactory levels. Id.
237 Id. at 12.
238 Id. at 12. Passenger revenues, both domestic and international, rose approxi-
mately 13%, while cargo revenues remained essentially flat in both markets. Id. at 12,
13.
239 Id. at 12.
240 Id. at 13. Sale expenditures rose significantly (20%) in FY 1988 and increased
by 17% in FY 1989, while operating expenses generally rose by 14% in that year. Sales
expenditures as a percentage of total operating expenses have remained steady over the
last few years. Id.
241 Id. The level of fixed and other assets increased significantly from FY 1985 to
FY 1988 and current assets showed a huge increase in FY 1988. Enhanced capital
investment was reflected in the 32% increase in current and long-term liabilities from
FY 1985 to FY 1988. Id.
242 Id. at 12.
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JAL appears committed to future improvement of the quality and
performance of its equipment, as well as to an aggressive program of
diversification.24 JAL already has the world's largest fleet of Boeing
747's and has placed large orders for current-generation aircraft from
the 747-400 series and MD-11 transport planes made by McDonnell
Douglas Corp.24" JAL has invested in better ground equipment and
maintenance facilities245 as well as the development of advanced hard-
ware and software systems for its computerized reservation systems.246
Finally, JAL intends to raise revenues from diversified operations to
50% of parent company revenues by FY 1992.247
4.2. Railways
The JNR was, prior to its restructuring in 1987, the largest pub-
lic corporation in Japan. JNR has long had a reputation for outstand-
ing service, including its state-of-the-art high-speed bullet trains and
the frequency and punctuality of its regular train service. However,
JNR had long been hampered by an uncompetitive cost structure and,
as a result, had consistently run large and increasing deficits248 and in
the final two years before the railway was restructured had lost more
243 Id. at 14.
244 Id. "For example, JAL ... has firm orders for 40 of the current-generation
747-400 series, which needs only a two-person cockpit crew and offers a 10 percent-
plus improvement in fuel efficiency over the 747-300 model. In addition, JAL has
placed firm orders for 10 of the MD-11 transport .... " Id. at 14.
245 Id. New maintenance and repair facilities not only will be used for its own
fleet but may also help JAL secure a share of maintenance contracts from other
airlines.
JAL also is investing in automating many labor-intensive maintenance
and repair operations, [such as] a new $8 million washing device [which]
allows a four-person crew to clean a 747 jet in an hour . . . a specially
designed vehicle that has cut the number of service personnel needed to
replace an aircraft wheel from three to one; and a robot window polisher
[that] eliminates the costly process of removing scratched windows for
replacement.
Id.
246 Id. "JAL's AXESS computer reservation system is the most visible part of the
firm's ... $866.7 million medium-term plan to develop advanced software and hard-
ware systems to provide better service to customers. In cooperation with American Air-
lines, JAL is working on better transaction-processing software for reservations sys-
tems." Id.
2417 Id. "JAL has 17 consolidated subsidiaries (five of which are wholly owned)
and a minority interest in another 144 companies. Of special interest to JAL is the
hotel and leisure industry, which complements its core operations." Id.
248 OECD Japan 1987188, supra note 21, at 85. The Government had been
providing substantial subsidies to the JNR, including direct subsidies and interest pay-
ments on debt that was assumed by the Government. For example in FY 1985, the
level of subsidies equalled 12.1% of JNR's total expenditures and 31.1% of the JNR's
"value-added." Id.
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than $21.3 billion, bringing its total short-term debt to $94 billion and
its long-term debt to $157.3 billion.249 Moreover, in contrast to the
other public corporations, JNR was always subject to some degree of
competition in the passenger market and, in fact, private competitors as
a group carried nearly two-thirds of all passenger traffic with just half
of the employees. 5 '
As part of Nakasone's privatization strategy, in 1983 the govern-
ment appointed a special commission and a private advisory board to
study JNR's problems and to make recommendations regarding the
best way for the government to disengage itself from railway opera-
tions, while providing JNR with the best opportunity to solve its own
structural problems. 25' Generally, the JNR was found to be "overregu-
lated, uncompetitive, unresponsive, too big and plagued by poor labor-
management relations. ' 252 Specifically, the troubles of the railways
could be blamed on a number of factors:
1. JNR's obligation to maintain a uniform network of nationwide
service meant that it had to operate a number of unprofitable lines,
thereby placing it at a competitive disadvantage.
25 3
2. Even though JNR continued its development of high-speed
trains, it found itself in increasing levels of competition with various
substitutes, including domestic airlines for long-distance passengers and
road transport for freight and cargo.
2 54
3. The national scope of JNR's activities, as well as the size and
dispersion of its workforce, made it difficult for management to exercise
any effective control over day-to-day operations.
2 55
The advisory bodies recommended a radical restructuring for
JNR 6 and, in April 1987, the government split the "old" JNR up
2419 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 17.
250 Id. at 18. Private passenger railways had more stations (4,949 versus 4,600 for
JNR) and almost the same amount of rolling stock. Id.
251 Sakoh, supra note 22, at 6. Nakasone established a private advisory body, the
Special Administrative Research Council, and created the JNR Reform Commission.
Id.
252 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 17.
252 OECD Japan 1987/88, supra note 21, at 85. For example, JNR's fares in
the Tokyo area were often 150 to 200 percent of those charged by competing railways.
Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Sakoh, supra note 22, at 6. Specifically, the Special Administrative Research
Council recommended:
(1) Eliminating around 20,000 JNR jobs by 1985, bringing the level
down to 180,000 by 1987.
(2) Splitting the national railway system into six regional passenger rail-
way companies and one nationwide freight company in 1987 ....
(3) Transferring JNR to private management by 1987.
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into twelve new units, collectively referred to as the "Japan Railway
Group" ("JRG"). JRG consisted of six passenger lines,2 57 a firm set
up to lease bullet trains to the passenger companies and to support the
construction of new bullet trains,25 a holding company to handle the
old debts of JNR,2 59 a freight company, 60 and three subsidiaries to
conduct added activities in technical research, telecommunications and
information systems."" JNR's substantial assets - track, cars, rail
lines, stations and investments in nonrail enterprises - were divided
among the new companies,262 and the total number of employees was
immediately reduced by almost 20%.263 Plans were established for re-
ducing the level of the "old" debt through the sale of assets, including
sales to the operating companies, 6 4 and JRG abandoned its prior
equipment standard, which allowed it to purchase supplies from
cheaper suppliers in the Asian NICs.265
Although the passenger companies were to continue to face stiff
competition from their private competitors, particularly in the urban
markets, the reorganization appears to have been an immediate finan-
cial success from an operational perspective. All six of the operating
(4) Allowing JNR to expand its business into such fields as hotels, shop-
ping centers, and real estate development.
Id.
257 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 17. East Japan Railway Co., Ltd.,
Central Japan Railway Co., Ltd., West Japan Railway Co., Ltd., Shikoku Railway
Co., Ltd., Kyushu Railway Co., Ltd. and Hokkaido Railway Co., Ltd. Id. The passen-
ger lines were to be operated as private firms, although the Government originally
retained ownership of their shares. Id. at 18.
158 Shinkansen Holding Corp. Id. at 17.
159 JNR Settlement Corp. Id.
160 Japan Freight Railway Co., Ltd. Id.
161 The Railway Technical Research Institute, Railway Telecommunication Co.,
Ltd. and Railway Information Systems Co., Ltd. Id.
161 Id. at 18. JNR's assets included 200 rail lines, 13,000-plus miles of track,
45,500 rail cars (passenger and freight), 4,600 stations, 226 square miles of land and
approximately $277 million invested in 155 nonrail enterprises. Id. "The rapid in-
creases in land prices during the [1980s] has significantly enhanced the value of JNR's
holdings, particularly since much of the land was located in city centers." OECDJapan
1987/88, supra note 21, at 86.
265 OECD Japan 1987/88, supra note 21, at 86. Out of a pre-restructuring la-
bor force of 277,020 in 1986, 52,710 left the railways after the restructuring, 200,650
remained with the JRG and 23,660 were employed by the Settlement Corp. Id.
26 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 18. The debt was originally allocated
among JNR Settlement Corp. ($170.7 billion), Shinkansen Holding ($38 billion) and a
group that included three of the new operating companies and the new companies deal-
ing in telecommunications and information systems ($39.3 billion). Id. In turn, JNR
Settlement Corp.'s share of the debt was to be reduced by the sale of its real assets,
with the new operating companies paying approximately $95 billion, the sale of land
yielding about $50 billion, and the sale of other assets yielding $8 billion. OECD Japan
1987188, supra note 21, at 86.
165 OECD Japan 1987/88, supra note 21, at 86.
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companies broke even in their first year of operation (FY 1987), and
the trends regarding profitability continued for the next two years, al-
lowing them to reduce their share of the debt which they inherited from
JNR.266 The favorable results were achieved even though the compa-
nies have been unable to increase their fares in the high-volume urban
areas and continue to provide service in rural areas where, even though
they face little or no competition, services have remained unprofita-
ble.2 67 JRG's freight business has also been quite profitable.2 68
On the other hand, the remaining members of the JRG have, for a
variety of reasons, been unable to achieve the immediate financial gains
realized by the operating companies, although to a certain degree these
results reflect the specific objectives of the unit. JNR Settlement was
not expected to earn a profit, but rather was organized to reduce the
largest portion of the inherited debt. However, due to reduced pay-
ments from the operating companies, the need to finance further service
expansions and pressure to slow or postpone land sales, the companies'
aggregate debt had actually increased to about $250 billion by March
1990 and interest payments had risen to about $20 million per day.269
Shinkansen Holding was achieving firm revenues from leasing equip-
ment, although it also had some new debts from financing ongoing con-
struction projects.2 7 0 The nonrail companies continued to run signifi-
cant deficits due to the need to finance various start-up costs of new
28 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 18. In FY 1987, the group earned
$333.3 million after taxes and in FY 1988 the six companies showed a net profit of
$574 million. In FY 1989, JR East, JR Central and JR West, the three companies
which assumed a portion of the JR debt, had net profits of $444.7 million, $381.3
million and $171.3 million, respectively, which permitted them to reduce their share of
the debt to no more than $26 billion. However, the need for the operating companies to
reinvest profits to finance new services may substantially lengthen the overall debt-
reduction process. Id. Also, there is some concern that the three companies which serve
the smaller islands, where the volume of traffic is significantly smaller than on the
main island of Honshu where the "JR" lines operate, may not be able to sustain the
same degree of financial health as the main operating lines, perhaps resulting in the
need for another reorganization in the future. Id. at 19, 20. "
287 Id. at 18. "In addition, JRG still must contend with the pork-barrel politics
that lead to immensely expensive expansion into sparsely populated areas. The recently
completed Seikan tunnel, which links the main island of Honshu with the northern
island of Hokkaido, is a marvel of engineering; its cost was so high, however, that it
never can be economical. Political pressure reaches even to research activities." Id. at
19.
288 The freight business showed pretax income of $30.7 million in FY 1989, a
gain of $8 million over the previous year. JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 18.
29 Id. The Government appears to have asked JNR Settlement to ease attempts
to sell its properties in order to assist in cooling the overheated real estate market in
Japan. Id. In addition, JNR Settlement angered labor unions and politicians when it
issued dismissal notices, effective April 1, 1990, to about 2,600 workers who had been
cut in the 1987 reorganization and had not yet been reemployed. Id. at 19.
270 Id.
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operations.2
71
Three important aspects of JRG's future development are im-
provement of the quality and cost-efficiency of its services, its ability to
successfully diversify into ancillary services and its ability to use its ex-
isting valuable assets, such as its land holdings. Work continues on the
development of new high-speed trains, as well as the computerization
of reservations, ticketing and information services.127 Also, the ability of
the firm to use its railway ties to lease communications cables along
JRG rights-of-way, and the firm's efforts to lay a fiber-optic network,
may make it a key player in the deregulated Japanese telecommunica-
tions market.2 73 Finally, non-rail service businesses located alongside
railway lines, such as fast-food outlets, sundry stores and newsstands,
are natural extensions and may provide a means for employing excess
workers.274
A key element of the JRG's efforts to escape from governmental
control and achieve managerial autonomy would be some form of stock
offering to the public. By August 1990, both JR East and JR Central
were profitable enough to be eligible for listing on the TSE, and JR
West and the freight businesses were also thought to be near-term can-
didates for an offering. 7 5 Analysts estimated that the first sale of JR
East and JR Central shares, which was scheduled for the fall of 1991,
would bring in between $63 and $83 billion,276 which could be applied
to reduce the mounting JRG debt. Moreover, listing on the TSE would
mean that the railroads would be freed from a number of the govern-
mental controls currently in the JR Company Law. 77 However, the
MOT would still have the authority to regulate fares and services, and
271 Id.
272 Id. at 20. For example, improvements are being made to the "shinkansen
trains, increasing their energy efficiency, hauling capacity and speed from the current
150 miles per hour average." Id. at 20. Research continues on "an experimental
maglev ["magnetically levitated"] train with projected top speeds of up to 325 miles per
hour. Bringing the prototype to commercial use is expected to cost at least $25 billion
and take until the turn of the century." Id. at 19, 20. Interestingly, the award of the
building contract for the test track for the project to the home district of a powerful
politician touched off a land speculation frenzy which increased the cost of the project
and demonstrated the continuing influence of Japanese politics on railway business
matters.
273 Id. at 20.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. For example, the JR Company Law required each JRG firm to obtain
MOT approval of board member appointments, fund-raising operations and annual
business plans. Although the MOT hoped to retain these powers until the government
had sold all of its shares, TSE officials successfully argued that removal of these con-
trols was required in order to enhance the attractiveness of the offering. Id.
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every effort would be made to see that shares were placed in the hands
of "friendly" shareholders.2 78 However, general market difficulties,
particularly the performance of the NTT shares, may have severely
dampened the enthusiasm for the offering of shares of the JRG
companies.
4.3. Tobacco
The JTS, the smallest public enterprise, was established in 1949
to operate the government's monopoly on production and distribution of
tobacco projects in Japan. 79 JTS operated through a system of official
permits granted to tobacco producers, which included a guarantee by
the government that production would be purchased, and the appoint-
ment of designated retailers.28 Amounts received from consumers were
remitted directly to the National Treasury, effectively making the JTS
a taxing arm of the government.28'
Despite strong opposition from various elements within Japan,
82
trade tensions with the United States and the general push for priva-
tization led to widescale reforms of the JTS and the domestic tobacco
market in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the Diet restructured JTS into Ja-
pan Tobacco, Inc. ("JTI"), effective in April 1985, and a portion of the
shares in JTI were made available to the public.2 '8 3 Also, wholesale
business and import activities were liberalized, allowing new foreign
and domestic firms to enter the market upon registration with the
MOF.284 Finally, restrictions on sales outlets for foreign products were
eliminated, as were tariffs on cigarettes. 85 JTI retains a monopoly on
domestic production, 88 along with its purchase obligations,28 but now
278 Id. MOT planned to place about 30% to 40% of any publicly offered shares in
the hands of "friendly" shareholders. Id.
278 OECD Japan 1987188, supra note 21, at 93.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Sakoh, supra note 22, at 8. Opposition "came from the 90,000 tobacco farmers
who wield strong leverage within Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party. They fear that
'complete' JTS privatization will prompt massive imports of tobacco leaf from at least a
score of nations that produce the crop at much lower prices than Japan. Opposition
also came from the Ministry of Finance, which feared losing some of the $1.7 billion
annually contributed to the treasury by JTS. And, labor leaders were apprehensive that
a reduced Japanese domestic tobacco industry would mean fewer union members." Id.
282 OECD Japan 1987188, supra note 21, at 93; JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra
note 5, at 15.
284 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 5, at 15.
285 Id.
288 Sakoh, supra note 22, at 8. The Administrative Reform Council, Nakasone's
private advisory body, had called for completely abolishing the JTS monopoly powers
on tobacco manufacturing. Id.
287 JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra note 8, at 15.
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has more managerial independence and freedom to compete with new
foreign entrants.
JTI faces a number of future challenges. While analysts expect
JTI to maintain its dominant market position for sometime to come,288
several foreign firms have made significant inroads into the Japanese
cigarette market.28 9 More important, total cigarette sales increased by
less than two percent (2%) in FY 1989;290 government restrictions on
advertising, including the need to provide health warnings on cigarette
products, have made it extremely difficult to expand the domestic mar-
ket. 2 '1 As a result, JTI is struggling to develop new products, reduce
production costs and penetrate export markets.29 2 However, each of
these strategies may prove to be extremely difficult to execute.
JTI's market problems are reflected in its mixed financial per-
formance over the last several years. 293 This market strategy has led to
a flattening of net sales since FY 1982 and due to increases in outlays
for sales and marketing JTI's net income has declined over the same
period.29 4 The former transfers to the National Treasury have been
28S Id. at 16.
JT's Mild Seven family of products continues to account for more than
40% of all cigarette sales in Japan. Combined with its other domestic
brands - Cagin, Caster, Seven Stars and SomeTime - and foreign-li-
censed brands - Marlboro, Peace, Frontier, Hi-Lite and Hope - JT
commanded a little less than 86% of the Japanese market in FY 1989.
The only foreign product to make the list of 10 best-selling cigarette
brands was Lark Milds in tenth place.
Id. at 16.
289 Three foreign firms have made the biggest inroads into Japan's cigarette mar-
ket. Phillip Morris Inc. (who sells Lark, Parliament and Merit brands) led the pack
with an estimated 8.3% market share in FY 1989, followed by Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. (maker of Kent and Lucky Strike brands) at three percent (3%) and
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co./M.C. Tobacco Co. (Vantage brand) at 1.9%. With all
other imports accounting for about one percent (1%) of the market, foreign brands
made up about 14% of overall consumption in the April 1989-March 1990 period.
Observers predict that this share will rise to 20 percent within a few years; particularly
since JT must use uniform domestic leaf (which it blends with leaf produced overseas)
and the fact that JT cannot compete with the cachet of foreign brands, Id. at 15, 17.
290 Id. at 15.
291 Id. at 16.
292 Id. at 17. "Export market development poses some tough questions. Antismok-
ing sentiment in advanced and developing countries is gaining strength, threatening
ambitious expansion plans. While the Eastern European and the Soviet markets are
attracting interest from American and Western European tobacco firms, JT has yet to
make a move into these potentially lucrative areas." Id. at 17.
292 Id. at 16.
294 Id. Net sales, which stood at - 2,815 billion for FY 1982, actually declined
steadily over the next few years to stand at Y 2,724 billion for FY 1988. S. G & A
expenses rose from * 184 billion for FY 1982 to * 254 billion for FY 1988. Income
before taxes, which is the only comparable measure of profitability given the interven-
ing privatization, for FY 1982 (- 93 billion) declined to Y 85 billion for FY 1988.
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replaced by the imposition of a Tobacco Excise Tax and, like the other
provalizial companies, income generated by the JTI is now subject to
income taxation. 95
Although the firm cannot abandon its core business lines, the ulti-
mate answer for JTI may come from diversification, including "manu-
facturing consulting, machine engineering services, and a line of agri-
cultural products, such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, as well as the
development of a prescription and over-the-counter pharmaceutical
business."29 Also, in an attempt to counter any negative image created
by its cigarette products, JTI "has opened a chain of health clubs and
introduced a line of health and sports drinks," as well as "food prod-
ucts appealing to the health conscience."2 7 However, profits from these
ventures are still too small to have a meaningful impact on the bottom
line; management concedes that significant amounts of further invest-
ment will be required in order to achieve their objectives. 9 8
5. PRIVATIZATION AND THE JAPANESE CAPITAL MARKETS
5.1. Background
While deregulation and enhanced competition were clearly the
primary purposes of the measures adopted in 1985, the government's
fiscal woes made the sale of shares in the new privatized companies a
high priority. Not only would the sales generate revenues which could
be used by the government for other public purposes, such as the retire-
ment of outstanding debt and the funding of new public works projects,
but the government's ability to discontinue funding of deficit operations
for the corporations was also anticipated to have a positive net effect on
the fiscal health of the nation. While it was originally intended that the
government would sell up to two-thirds (2A) of the NTT shares to the
public, liquidate its remaining investment in JAL and, if appropriate,
"spin-off" a portion of its interest in the regional railways and other
members of the new JRG, circumstances ultimately changed the eco-
nomic and political environment in which the sales were to be effected.
However, the activity ultimately generated by privatization of the
mammoth public corporations has had a profound effect on Japanese
capital markets and their allied institutions.
Id. at 16.
295 Id. at 16.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
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5.2. Offering and Trading of NTT Shares
In October 1986, "the government sold 200,000 shares of NTT
stock on an auction basis," the first to be offered to the public.2 9 9 The
purpose of the auction was to establish the price at which the remain-
ing 1,700,000 shares in the offering were to be sold. In the-auction,
"each bidder was required to purchase a minimum of 100 shares and a
maximum of 20,000 shares if they won the bid."300 As a result, "502
institutional investors and 191 individuals proved to have made success-
ful bids . . . rang[ing] from a high of 2.39 million yen per share to
1.017 million yen per share," with 90% of the chosen bids falling under
1.4 million yen.30' The weighted average share price of the successful
bids was 1.197 million yen per share (approximately $7,500 per share
based on a then-current exchange rate of 160 yen per dollar), which
was the price set by the government for the offer of the remaining
shares. 302 From the auction itself, the government has raised almost 240
billion yen, the equivalent of $1.5 billion.303
In November 1986, the remaining 1,700,000 shares in the first
offering were made available to the public by an application process.
30 4
Each applicant was limited to one share and, since the government re-
ceived approximately 10.7 million applications, the purchasers were de-
termined by lottery.3 0 5 The "successful applicants were announced on
December 29, 1986, . . . [and] in this first sale of NTT shares, the
Japanese government is estimated to have received 2.3 trillion yen," or
approximately $14.6 billion, an amount equal to about 4.25% of gov-
ernment revenues in fiscal year 1987, or about 20% of the new public
debt in that year.30 6 The initial public offering of NTT's shares was so
large that the proceeds exceeded, by more than three times, the total
amount raised in all of the other public offerings on Japanese ex-
299 JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 14.
300 Id.
301 Id. The ten largest successful bidders in the auction and the number of shares
purchased by them in the auction was as follows: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
(10,000), Daiwa Bank (10,000), Toyo Trust Bank (10,000), Yasuda Trust Bank
(7,200), Sumitomo Mutual Life Insurance (7,200), Chuo Trust Bank (3,500),
Sumitomo Trust Bank (3,500), Matsushita Electric Industrial (3,000), NTT Employ-
ees Shareholding Group (2,800) and Junichi Niwasaki (2,400). Id.
302 Id.
SO Id. The computation of the amount raised by the Government from the initial
auction is based on a then-current exchange rate of 160 yen per dollar.
SO4 Id.
05 Id.
306 Id.; JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 15. The computation of the amount raised
by the Government from the initial auction is based on a then-current exchange rate of
160 yen per dollar.
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changes during 1985."0'
"The shares of NTT were to be listed on all eight of the Japanese
stock exchanges from February 1987."308 In order to list the shares on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE"), a number of listing conditions
were waived, including the requirements that listed shares make up
more than 50% of the company's issued and outstanding shares and
that the company disclose its five year earnings history.30 9 NTT shares
were listed on the TSE's First Section, a rarity in that companies gen-
erally commence trading on the Second Section."'0 In contrast to every
other firm listed on the TSE, except KDD, foreign ownership of NTT
shares was prohibited, although observers felt that foreigners could ac-
quire some economic interest in, if not the right to vote, the shares
through various arrangements.311
NTT's shares proved to be a spectacular success, at least in the
early months of trading, for investors fortunate enough to have pur-
chased shares in the auction and application process. In the first eleven
days of trading in February 1987, the share price actually doubled to
2.4 million yen and, on one trading day, the volume in NTT shares
exceeded 43 trillion yen, an amount which was greater than the aggre-
gate trading volume on West Germany's stock exchanges. When the
share price rose further, to 3 million yen (approximately $21,000 per
share based on a then-current exchange rate of 143 yen per dollar),
NTT had dearly become the world's largest corporation, at least in
terms of market capitalization, with a value that was "more than four
times larger than that of the previous leader IBM and ten times that of
AT&T." '312 As might be expected, a good deal of the demand for the
307 JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 13.
308 Id. at 14.
309 Id. Obviously, only 12.5% of the NTT shares were originally listed, with the
remaining shares owned by the Government. Since NTT was only recently privatized,
it could not satisfy the five year earnings and disclosure requirements. Id. at 15.
31o Id. at 14.
311 Id. at 15. For example, "foreigners may be able to obtain NTT shares by
arranging that there be no name transfers on shares, or by making investment via fund
trusts or designated monetary trusts (tokkin)." Actually, the Asian Wall Street Journal
reported on May 11, 1987 that the Government believed that foreigners may have held
up to five percent (5%) of the then-outstanding public shares (i.e., five percent (5%) of
the 12.5% outstanding shares), attributing those holdings to shares purchased from
Japanese and foreign securities firms which were members of the TSE who originally
purchased the shares for their own account with the intent of subsequent resale to their
foreign customers. JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 16.
312 JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 1. In addition to NTT, eight other
Japanese companies stood among the twelve largest corporations in the world in terms
of market capitalization. Among the firms were Tokyo Electric Power (3rd), Sumitomo
Bank (4th), Nomura Securities (5th), Industrial Bank of Japan (6th), Dai-ichi Kangyo
Bank (7th), Mitsubishi Bank (8th), Fuji Bank (9th) and Sanwa Bank (11th). IBM
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shares came from institutional investors, who sought a close and strong
relationship with this new market behemoth, and Japanese securities
firms angling for a portion of the underwriting work that was antici-
pated from future government offerings. However, individual investors
were also well represented, and stockbrokers attributed their "record
breaking business results to the opening of 180,000 new accounts by
individual investors buying the shares of NTT." 1" As of the end of its
March 1987 business year, NTT had the largest number of sharehold-
ers, about 700,000, among the listed corporations in Japan.31"
The first NTT share offering produced exactly the type of revenue
source upon which the government had relied. As the share price re-
mained strong, even after the market crash of October 1987, when
NTT shares fell eight percent (8%) to around 2.8 million yen, as op-
posed to a general reduction in the TSE of about 16%, investors looked
forward to the next offering of 1.95 million shares in November
1987.15 In that offering, which was made by direct sales to securities
firms rather than through the auction process,,"' the government raised
an additional five trillion yen at a price of 2.6 billion yen 17 (approxi-
mately $19,000 per share based on a then-current exchange rate of 137
yen per dollar), again representing a significant portion of the govern-
ment revenue (9%) and new public debt (48%) for that fiscal year.
318
After the second offering, the 25% of NTT shares that were tradable
on the TSE represented 21% of the total value of that exchange.3 119
In addition to the revenues received from the sale of shares, the
government also stood to benefit from dividend payments and corporate
income taxes received from the newly privatized firm. For example, in
the fiscal year ended March 1988, the government received nearly $500
million in dividends from NTT and collected another $1.5 billion in
(2nd), Exxon Corporation (10th) and General Electric (12th) completed the list. Of the
firms, NTT represented the largest percentage (11.2%) of its nation's stock market, as
compared with 3.7% for IBM, the runner-up. JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 1.
818 Id. at 18.
81, Id. at 16. The previous leader, Tokyo Electric, had about 380,000 sharehold-
ers. Other than the MOF, which remained the largest shareholder, the largest holders
of NTT shares as of the end of March 1987 included Sumitomo Life Insurance,
Sumitomo Trust Bank, Toyo Trust Bank, Chuo Trust Bank, Yasuda Trust Bank,
Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Yasuda Trust (Tokkin), Mitsui Trust Bank and NTT Em-
ployee Holdings. Holding among this group ranged from 26,266 shares to 12,811
shares. Id.
816 Id. at 15.
316 Id. at 16.
817 Id. at 15.
818 JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 15.
819 Id.
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corporate income taxes.$"0 As such, the government had a significant
interest in NTT operations, including such traditionally internal mat-
ters as corporate dividend and tax policies. Such a situation created the
possibility that any governmental policies regarding competition and
regulation might, to some extent, be influenced by the government's
interest in the financial success of NTT. Moreover, within the govern-
ment, each of MPT, MOF and MITI also had a strong interest in the
viability of NTT in the years to come, 1 a situation which may have
tended to create a strong assumption on the part of investors, particu-
larly individual investors, that the government would act in a manner
which would preserve the value of NTT equities.
The surge in the volume of activity on the TSE, as well as the
volume of funds realized by the government from NTT sales and divi-
dends had, at least in part, an indirect effect on Japan's overall trade
balance relationship with the United States. The NTT offering opened
up new domestic opportunities for institutional investors in Japan,
which had previously funneled their funds to government and private
securities in the United States. 22 Also, the government's ultimate deci-
sion to use a large portion of the proceeds from the NTT sales to fund
public works projects, which would have the effect of stimulating de-
mand within the country, rather than to retire some of the outstanding
320 Id. at 16. -
3 MPT's interest in the performance of NTT stemmed, to some degree, from the
traditional measures of bureaucratic success which have existed in Japan since the late
19th Century. Ezra Vogel has noted that "Since the late nineteenth century, Japanese
society has measured the success of bureaucrats concerned with various sectors of the
economy by the achievements of their sector. This accountability provided the personal
drive for bureaucrats that sustained a tradition of governmental assistance to industry.
Beginning at the same time, American society measured the success of comparable bu-
reaucrats not by the achievements of the sector under them but by how well they en-
forced the rules, and this sustained a tradition of adversarial relations and control over
industry. The Japanese bureaucrat responsible for the success of his industry has a
powerful incentive to help his team do well against rivals, foreign or domestic . . ." See
Vogel (1985) at p. 166, as quoted in JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 16. MOF had a
financial interest in the proceeds from NTT offerings and dividend and tax payments
and, as a result of a last-minute accommodation at the time that the privatization and
liberalization measures were passed, MITI had an indirect interest in the dividend
proceeds used to fund the Japan Key Technology Center, which was managed by
MITI and was to conduct research under the rubric of the "Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Research Institute International" in four major areas: intelligent communications,
telephone (realtime) translation, human auditory and visual mechanisms, and light-
wave and radio-wave communications. Id. at 14-16.
322 JAPAN FiN. L., March-April 1987 at 1-2. Japanese investors had accumulated
large holdings in government securities in the United States. Some feared that a fall in
demand would lead to higher interest rates in the United States, thereby exacerbating
the existing government spending deficit in that country. On the other hand, analysts
thought it would be unlikely that Japanese investors would take any action which
might diminish the value of the their existing holdings. Id. at 2.
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public debt, was a reaction to criticisms that Japan had no real desire
to take steps to alleviate tensions caused by the large current account
deficit between Japan and the United States.2
The privatization of NTT also created a number of new opportu-
nities in the financial area as the firm took to developing and offering
new securities instruments, 2 4 sometimes turning to one or more foreign
securities firms for assistance. Even prior to the initial equity offering,
NTT became the fifth Japanese company to issue Euroyen straight
bonds, completing a 50 billion yen deal in September 1986.25 In addi-
tion, NTT made a private placement of a 200 million swiss franc
straight bond issue with the aid of Swiss Union Bank.3 26 In fact, the
Swiss firm underwrote the entire issue itself, making it the first offering
by a Japanese firm that did not include a Japanese bank or securities
firm as lead manager or sub-manager.
32 7
The MOF scheduled a third offering of another 12.5% of the
shares for November 1988, with the intent that the shares be offered at
2.47 million yen (approximately $18,430 per share based on a then-
current exchange rate of 134 yen per dollar), a level which established
a price-earnings ratio of about 220.28 If completed on those terms, the
new shares would have raised an additional $36 billion, and the total
revenues from share sales would have been about $88 billion, valued at
the currency exchange rate at the time of the offering. 29 However,
1988 saw the beginning of a continuing erosion in the stock price for
the NTT shares. In the wake of the Recruit scandal s3 and the overall
32 Originally, the Government had been criticized for its original intention of
using the proceeds from the offering to retire the "deficit-financing" bonds issued in
prior years and, at the same time, imposing a sales tax increase which, if undertaken,
would have the effect of further reducing domestic demand at a time when the NTT
sales created a revenue source which exceeded the anticipated proceeds from the sales
tax increase. Id. at 1.
324 Privatization meant that NTT could no longer depend upon Government
funding for its budget, operations and research. As such, the company needed to de-
velop its own sources of new funding, particularly since the proceeds of the sale of its
shares went directly to the Government, rather than to the firm for its own internal
use.
325 JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 15.
326 Id.
32 Id.
328 JAPAN FiN. L., June 1987, at 15-16.
329 Id. at 15.
330 Former NTT President Shinto was found to be at the center of the Recruit
Cosmos Co., Ltd. scandal in that he allegedly tried to secure Prime Minister
Nakasone's favor by buying American supercomputers to assist in easing bilateral trade
tensions and then turning around and immediately reselling those computers, at a re-
duced price, to the parent company of Recruit Cosmos. JEI REPORT No. 32A, supra
note 5, at 6. In light of the reported insider trading profit-taking by key political figures
and businessmen in Recruit Cosmos stock, Shinto was put on trial for bribery, a move
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
deterioration of values in the Japanese securities markets, NTT's share
price dropped substantially, eroding the confidence placed in the shares
by individual investors who could ill afford the paper loss in their
investment.38 1
In the face of weak demand, the third sale of shares in October
1988 was actually held at only 1.9 million yen per share (approxi-
mately $12,667 per share based on a then-current exchange rate of 150
yen per dollar). Although the MOF encouraged brokerage firms to
support the price of the shares following the second and third offerings,
neither the MOF nor the broker could forestall further depreciation in
the value of the shares.33 2 Additional offerings in 1989 were delayed in
deference to the bull market, and NTT and the MOF have been left to
find a way to restore public confidence in the firm.
333
The share price fell further in the general market contraction dur-
ing the first quarter of 1990, dropping to less than its initial offering
price by mid-March.3 4 More importantly, NTT shares did not join in
the recovery which began during the second quarter of 1990 and by
late July 1990 had depreciated to one million yen. 35 As of the end of
August 1991, NTT's share price stood at 758,000 yen (approximately
$5,500 per share based on a then-current exchange rate of 137 yen per
dollar), 36 meaning that investors who had purchased NTT shares in
the initial auction lost about 37% on their original investment and that
investors who bought shares when the price had reached its high of
3,000,000 yen per share in the frenzy which followed the initial offer-
ing had lost fully 75% of their original investment.
5.3. Offering and Trading of JAL Shares
In addition to the offer and sale of NTT shares, the government
anticipated significant additional revenues from sales of its remaining
34.5% in JAL in autumn 1987. sS  Like NTT, JAL, which was subject
that was particularly shocking in light of the great respect in which he was held in the
political and investment communities. Id. at 7.
331 Id. at 7. "Ninety-eight percent of all NTT shareholders are individuals," as of
the date of the report (August 1990), although they only held 17.5% of the outstanding
shares. Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
I" In mid-March 1990, NTT's share price stood at 1.18 million yen per share
(approximately $7,867 per share at the then-current exchange rate of 150 yen per dol-
lar). Id. at 6.
335 Id.
336 The figures are based on closing prices for the NTT shares. Wall St. J., Aug.
28, 1991, at C10.
-13 "The MOF held 4:9% of the stock of JAL at JAL's founding in 1951 ... the
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to restriction on the amount of its shares which might be held by for-
eigners,"'8 already enjoyed a significant market capitalization, particu-
larly when compared with that of the other privatized airlines around
the world."' Although JAL had experienced some earnings problems
during the prior year, the price for its shares had remained strong and,
in fact, had doubled since October 1986, perhaps anticipating the gov-
ernment offering. ' It was estimated that the government would re-
ceive anywhere from 36 to 600 billion yen (over $4 billion based on a
then-current exchange rate of 150 yen per dollar) from the sale of the
JAL shares and, "in order to obtain the highest possible share price
[JAL] is assuring investors that it plans to revive its dividend by the
March 1988 term.
'3 41
One of the most interesting aspects of the JAL offering was the
announced intent to place "over one-half of the shares . . . in the
hands of stable-shareholders, such as financial institutions who [would]
hold the shares on a long-term basis, rather than as traders." 42 Of the
48,099,000 shares which were still owned by the government, Japanese
banks were to purchase 12,000,000 shares, or 25%, of the offering, 43
as sold to Japanese nationals." JEI REPORT No. 32 A, supra note 5, at 11. The actual
timing of the sales depended upon the resolution of the debate in the Diet regarding the
LDP's tax increase proposal and the date that the second set of NTT shares were to be
offered. JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 16.
31" Specifically, holdings of foreigners in all Japanese airlines could not exceed
more than one-third of the company's shares. JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 14.
Under existing requirements, Japanese airline licenses could be cancelled in the event
that foreigners acquired more than one-third of the shares of the licensee firm. Id.
3" Around May 1987, JAL's market capitalization was about $15 billion, which
far exceeded such foreign firms as Singapore Airlines (Market Capitalization: $5 bil-
lion/Public Ownership: 37%), British Airways (Market Capitalization: $2.5 billion/
Public Ownership: 100%) and KLM (Market Capitalization: $2 billion/Public Own-
ership: 61%). At that time, privatization was proposed for a number of other govern-
ment-managed airlines, including Air Canada, Air New Zealand, Australian Airlines,
El Al, Mexicana and Qantas. JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 16.
340 Id. Analysts pointed out that JAL's price-earnings experience evidenced the
fact that share prices in Japanese markets often bore little, if any, relation to the under-
lying profitability of the company. Id.
41 JAPAN FIN. L., May 1987, at 19.
342 JAPAN FIN. L., March-April 1987, at 14.
141 The alliances with Japanese banks made sense for a number of reasons. Upon
privatization, "JAL w[ould] no longer be able issue government guaranteed bonds [to
finance its operations] . . .[and will] substantially increase its borrowings from banks.
JAL plans to give greatest priority to banks with the large holdings of JAL shares." In
fact, JAL actually stipulated the desired shareholdings of the 16 major banks following
the offering. See JAPAN FIN. L., May 1987, at 19, for a list of the major bank share-
holders of JAL and the amount that JAL had asked such banks to hold following the
offering. The sale of the remaining shares would also mean that a number of additional
changes would be made to the manner in which JAL was operated. For example, the
Government would no longer be able to intervene in JAL affairs by "appointing air-
lines executives and auditors, and the authorization of the government" would no
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"life insurance companies [would purchase] 5.6 million shares, non-life
insurance companies [would purchase] 2.7 million shares, other finan-
cial institutions [would purchase] 100,000 shares and business associa-
tion corporations [would purchase] 3.9 million shares."' 44 As a result,
financial institutions would hold more than 40% of the outstanding se-
curities of JAL after the offering.
45
The JAL offering, as well as the activity created by the sale of the
NTT shares, increased the value of other stocks in the airline industry.
For example, when TDA undertook to list its shares on the over-the-
counter market in late March 1987, .shares were initially priced at
7,260 yen per share. 46 However, "during the first day of trading
shares prices reached as high as 30,000 yen per share . . . [giving] the
company a price earnings ratio of 519 times, [based on earnings fore-
casts for the then-current year], and a total market capitalization of 570
billion yen, a record for a company which [did] not pay dividends.
347
6. CONCLUSION
6.1. The Rise and Fall of Tokyo's Equity Markets
By the late 1980's, Japanese securities markets rose and fell with
increasing independence from the performance of shares in New York
and London. 4 In late 1986 and early 1987, trading volume, and prof-
its for Japanese securities firms, 49 increased substantially on the To-
kyo markets due, in part, to the first offering of NTT shares, general
bullish sentiment and the entry of new capital from institutional inves-
tors fleeing a bond market depressed by rising interest rates.350 As
noted above, the NTT offering brought many new individual investors
into the equity markets and, in the first four months of 1987, the aver-
age daily turnover in the Tokyo exchanges soared to over 1.2 billion
longer be required in order for JAL to "issue bonds, dispose of profits [through the
payment of dividends], borrow long term funds, amend [its] articles of incorporation
and sell or acquire aircraft." Id.
34 JAPAN FIN. L., June 1987, at 16.
345 Id.
" JAPAN FIN. L., May 1987, at 19.
347 Id.
3,8 Graven, Tokyo Market Is Setting Its Own course, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at
41, col. 1. (Hisamichi Sawa, First Vice President, Prudential-Bache Securities (Japan)
Ltd., was quoted as saying "The correlation between price movements in New York
and price movements in Tokyo is becoming less and less.").
348 Under pressure from the United States, some foreign firms were provided with
some access to the booming Japanese markets. For example, three United States firms
were part of the underwriting syndicate for an NTT offering. Wall St. J., Nov. 20,
1987, at 1.
Graven, supra note 348.
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shares compared to an average of 708.6 million shares in 1986 - a
66% increase over the prior year. 51
From December 1984 to December 1989, participants in Japanese
equity markets were rewarded with spectacular rates of return. During
that period, the Nikkei Index rose 237% and the yen rose 75%, mean-
ing that, in dollars, the Tokyo market provided a 42.7% compound an-
nual rate of return. 52 The rise in share prices far exceeded gains in
corporate earnings during that period and, by the end of 1987, the
overall price-earnings ratio soared to 53, while the ratio in the United
States at that time stood at "just" 14.4.11s Analysts attributed the wide
differential in values between shares in Japan and the United States to
a "liquidity build-up" created by the current account surplus during
that period; most of the build-up was retained in the corporate sector
for further investment rather than distributed to the public to increase
consumer spending and reduce the trade-related surplus.
354
However, the new decade has brought trouble to the Tokyo mar-
kets. First, the growth in the Japanese money supply, which had been
held to a steady, non-inflationary annual rate of seven to eight percent
until early 1987, rose to nearly 11% during 1987-89, providing more
people with money to spend on imports which would reduce the cur-
rent account surplus.3 55 Second, large increases in the value of the yen
between 1986 and 1989 contributed to higher import levels.35 6 Third,
real wages increased substantially in 1988 and 1989, leading to further
domestic consumption.3 57 In short, a number of factors combined to
stop the growth in the current account balance and, after reaching its
peak of $87 billion in 1987, the surplus fell - to about $40 billion in
351 Id.
35 Gressel, Tokyo - A Stock Market Like Any Other, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1990, at
A20, col. 3.
35S Id.
, Id. To be sure, a good deal of the current account surplus was used to
purchase comparatively cheap stocks, bonds and real estate abroad, particularly in the
United States. However, as the Japanese markets continued to rise and the value of the
dollar fell, thereby reducing the value of any existing foreign investments, institutional
investors in Japan poured more and more capital into domestic stock markets. Id.
35 Id. The acceleration in the growth of the Japanese monetary supply was
caused, in part, by attempts to adhere to the Louvre Accord of 1987. Id. It should be
noted that the increase in the money supply not only led to more consumer spending
but also allowed corporations to raise additional capital at very low interest rates.
Therefore, in 1990, Japanese corporations spent $660 billion on plant and equipment,
while corporations in the United States spent only $510 billion. Barnathan, et. al.,
Hidden Japan: How the System Really Works, INr'L Bus. Wx., Aug. 26, 1991, at 14-
22 [hereinafter Hidden Japan].
35 Import volumes rose 37.5% between 1986 and 1989. Gressel, supra note 352.
357 Real wages increased 3.3% in 1988 and about 2.4% in 1989. Id.
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1990.8' As a result, the "liquidity build-up" was dissipated, and share
prices began to fall to a level commensurate with general economic con-
ditions as they existed five years earlier. 359
In many ways, the rise and fall of the NTT shares,360 the massive
revenues received by the government and securities dealers from sales
of, and trading in, NTT shares, and the severe losses borne by individ-
ual investors with respect to their investment of savings in NTT shares
illustrates much of what concerns domestic and foreign observers of the
Japanese securities markets. Recent scandals in the banking and securi-
ties industries have shaken the political and financial infrastructure
that has led Japan to the heights of economic prosperity, leading ana-
lysts to the following criticisms:36'
1. LDP politicians, who have dominated the Japanese political
leadership since the beginning of the post-War recovery efforts 62 ap-
pear to have used their relationships with brokers and major institu-
tional investors to manipulate prices on the Tokyo securities markets to
their advantage.36 Moreover, in spite of the announced intention of
liberalizing Japanese telecommunications markets and dismantling
some of the inherent competitive advantages retained by NTT follow-
ing its privatization, NTT remains a dominant factor in the industry
and, not surprisingly, a major contributor to the LDP.
358 Id.
8 Id. By comparing such major macroeconomic statistics as domestic inflation
rate, current account surplus, interest rates and the price of oil, Gressel concluded that
Japan's "situation" as of the end of 1989 was roughly equivalent to that which existed
at the end of 1985, when the market's price-earnings ratio closed at 26. Id. As such, the
Nikkei Index would have had to fall to the 18,000 to 20,000 range in order for the
price-earnings ratio to return to the appropriate level; in fact, the Nikkei Index closed
at 21,641.30 on August 27, 1991. San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 27, 1991, at B-3. It
should be noted that Japanese ratios "ought" to be higher than those in the United
States due to the high rates of economic and productivity growth expected in Japan.
Gressel, supra note 352.
38" As of August 28, 1991, NTT shares were trading at $5,500 per share, based
on a closing price on that day of 758,000 yen per share and an exchange rate of 137.
Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1991, at C1, 010.
361 Based, in part, on the discussion in Hidden Japan, supra note 355, at 14-22.
8 In fact, the LDP is divided into five factions, each with a forceful leader. The
most powerful bloc is the Takeshita Faction named for former Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita, leader of the construction "zaku," who was forced to resign in the wake of
the Recruit scandals. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu belongs to the Komoto Faction, the
smallest of the factions with little influence. However, Kaifu remained a viable candi-
date precisely because he had, at least until now, appeared to have steered clear of the
scandals which brought down Takeshita and sullied others within his own Faction. Id.
at 20-21.
M6 As noted in Hidden Japan, "[Slecurities heavies often pump up prices of
shares held by LDP politicians." Id. at 16. These "donations," estimated by one source
to amount to about one-half of all LDP funding, gave the brokers significant influence.
Id. at 16.
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2. Both the MPT and NTT are managed by LDP appointees
under the direction of the telecommunications "zoku," an informal
"tribe" of Diet members from the LDP who intercede on behalf of
various interest groups in the course of policy deliberations on domestic
and foreign policies. " As such, critics note that while NTT has, at
least on paper, been "freed" from government control, it continues to
operate very much in accord with the wishes of the majority party.
Policy continues to be based more on personal relationships than on
dispassionate enforcement of laws.365
3. The MOF, which is also managed by one of the leaders of the
controlling faction of the LDP, 6 6 not only controls fiscal and monetary
policies, including the decision as to when additional shares of NTT
stock were to be offered to the public, but also acts as the "regulator" of
the securities, banking and insurance sectors of the economy.387 As
such, the MOF was positioned to orchestrate sales of the NTT shares
through brokers at premium prices, thereby increasing government rev-
enues and brokerage commissions, which are fixed by the MOF.
4. Japanese securities firms "cooperate" with the MOF by insur-
ing that initial offerings are placed at premium prices, that shares held
in special trust accounts.. 8 for Japan's major corporate investors and
LDP members are "protected" from depreciation," and that the mar-
kets remain steady in the face of significant downturns elsewhere, as
3 Id. at 15, 20. Shin Kanemaru, who is the leader of the telecommunications
"zoku," also heads the Takeshita Faction of the LDP, which is perceived as the most
powerful bloc of politicians in the country. Id. at 21.
365 Id. at 14-15.
S Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who is taking a good deal of the blame
for the recent problems in the securities and banking sectors, is a leader of the
Takeshita faction and was rumored to be a strong candidate for election as Prime Min-
ister in the elections of October 1991. Id. at 20-21.
367 In effect, the MOF has many of the same functions as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Federal Reserve and state banking and insurance regulators
combined. Id. at 17. Also, the MOF controls the nation's taxing authority and the
national budgetary process, activities which fall to the relatively independent Internal
Revenue Service and Office of Management & Budget in the United States. Id. at 17.
3" These funds, referred to as "eigyo tokkin," were established and managed by
the securities firms in order to allow preferred clients to participate in the bull market.
Id. at 16. Since the recent scandals, the funds have been banned in order to cool specu-
lation and restore some degree of investor confidence in the market and its brokers. Id.
369 For example, Hitachi Ltd.'s stock market investments were basically "insured"
by Nomura Securities, which paid out $16 million over the last few years to cover
Hitachi's losses. Id. at 14. Now foreign investors, who also suffered losses in the Tokyo
markets during that period, are considering legal action against the "Big Four" securi-
ties firms which control the industry in Japan. Id. Interestingly, concerns about the
payments do not appear to stem from any moral compunction, but from the MOF's
aggravation when securities firms attempted to deduct the payments as entertainment
expenses for tax purposes. Id.
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occurred in October 1987."1 In return, the firms realize substantial
profits from underwriting fees and commissions, as well as from their
own positions in the securities.
5. Individual investors, induced into the market for the first time
in 1986 through the NTT offering, stand out as the biggest "losers."
' 71
Unable to avail themselves of the protections afforded to institutional
investors by the LDP and the securities firms, individuals, many of
whom can only afford to buy one or two shares, can ill afford the rapid
depreciation in the paper value of their investment. However, it has
been observed that consumers, in spite of their losses, accept the "be-
hind-the-scenes" dealings of their politicians and industrial leaders as
part of Japanese culture, although their willingness to actually return
to the markets has yet to be shown.37 2
On the surface at least, many of the main protagonists appear to
have taken the lead in repairing the damage which has been done to
Japan's global image from the recent disclosures. The MOF itself has
moved against various speculatory schemes, 3 73 while a number of pro-
posals, including Prime Minister Kaifu's call for the creation of an
oversight agency along the lines of the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission, have been advanced for curtailing the ministry's
powers.374 The Keidanren moved to censure the offending brokers; its
chairman, Gaishi Hiraiwa, organized a task force on reform of the fi-
nancial system.375 However, while many hope that the realization that
Japan must now observe global "rules" will upset the traditional struc-
ture of power, there will be strong resistance to any reform to a system
which has been so successful to all involved, even those individual in-
vestors who suffered the temporary setback in the financial markets.376
171 It is generally believed that the MOF, in response to the October 1987 market
crash, has continuously pressured brokerage firms to prop up the market and to con-
tinue buying United States government bonds in the face of huge losses. Id.
$72 Id. at 16.
372 Id. at 18. In fact, it has been observed that consumers were more indignant
about the imposition of a three percent (3%) consumption tax than about the disclo-
sures in the recent scandals. Id.
373 Id. at 16.
374 Id. at 18.
171 Id. Fired Nomura Securities chairman Setsuya Tabuchi was quickly dismissed
as Vice Chairman of Keidanren. Id.
376 It may be that real reform will not occur until healthy opposition to the LDP
emerges. Id. at 22. In fact, as this article goes to press, it is apparent that the reforms
advanced by Kaifu and others have had little success and that Kaifu himself has been
replaced by more traditional elements within the LDP.
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6.2. The Lessons of Privatization
Privatization is generally considered in the context of actions
which might be taken by the government in lesser-developed countries
in order to accomplish a variety of social, economic and political objec-
tives.3 77 However, when the policy is implemented in one of the larger
industrialized economies, such as Japan or Great Britain, the lessons
may be somewhat different, particularly when the enterprise is one of
the world's largest firms operating in a strategic technological industry,
such as telecommunications.3 78 In many ways, it may be premature to
posit the ultimate lessons of privatization in Japan, particularly in light
of recent events and the possibility that NTT may, within a few years,
be once again radically restructured and deregulated. However, the fol-
lowing areas are worth noting:
Market Activity. The NTT offering had a vivid and lasting effect
on the growth and breadth of Japan's securities markets in the late
1980's. The overall level of trading activity increased substantially fol-
lowing the sale of the NTT shares; individual investors, enticed by the
allure and apparent security of shares in the former public corporation,
entered the market in record numbers. As a result, companies attained
spectacular price to earnings ratios, far out of proportion to corporate
earnings and investment funds were funneled into the secondary trad-
'7 Privatization, which is generally defined as the transfer of public assets to pri-
vate ownership, usually occurs after efforts to control perceived "inefficiencies" of the
public enterprise have failed. Not only does privatization offer the possibility of im-
proving the efficiency of enterprises, it also allows firms to gain access to private sector
financing and new markets, broadens share ownership, to create a desired link between
capital and savings in the economy, and, in many cases, to contribute to the reduction of
public sector deficits. See R. HEMMING and A. MANSOOR, PRIVATIZATION AND PUB-
LIC ENTERPRISES (International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 56, January,
1988).
378 It is important to remember that, for all of its current economic success, Japan
was actually a "developing" country as recently as forty years ago, when many of the
decisions leading to the modern structure and competitive position of NTT were being
formulated and implemented. However, circumstances can change over time such that
further economic development requires the use of economic markets dedicated to private
profit, rather than a system in which goods or services are produced in accordance with
rules and procedures administered by the government. In such cases, privatization of
state enterprises may be advocated for various reasons: (1) "private owners who will
seek a profit and will be subject to competition (including competition in the capital
markets) will have greater incentive" to enhance efficiency of production and distribu-
tion; (2) once the basic infrastructure has been developed, further advances can be
funded through private capital, allowing government revenues to be diverted to other
public uses; (3) private ownership permits the recruitment of "more skilled en-
trepreneurial and managerial talent" than might be available if the enterprise were
operated by the government; and (4) privatization "reduces the danger of excessive gov-
ernment power. . . and reduces the scope for corruption." G. ROTH, THE PRIVATE
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 165 (1987).
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ing markets in record amounts, leading to substantial commissions and
revenues for Japan's large securities firms.
Market Regulation. Ultimately, trading in NTT shares illustrated
many of the perceived deficiencies in the regulation of Japanese trading
markets by the government, as well as by its own constituent securities
firms. Practices which would constitute "insider trading" and market
manipulation in the United States were apparently common practice in
Japan, and the size of the offer of NTT shares, and volatility of their
trading price, combined to undermine the credibility of its market valu-
ation. The continued interest of the government in NTT's share per-
formance, both from a fiscal and, to some extent, personal perspective,
was a key element in the ultimate collapse of confidence in the shares.
Underwriting and Distribution Process. The process of distribut-
ing the shares of NTT and JAL held by the government is somewhat
unique to the Japanese perspective on equity ownership, as are the
restrictions placed upon foreign ownership of shares in the entities. The
initial NTT offering was priced through an "auction" process, while
subsequent NTT offerings, as well as the placement of the final
tranche of JAL shares, were accomplished selectively through under-
writers and investors who could be counted upon for their "stability" in
holding the securities or, in the case of any of the securities firms, to
"support" trading activity. An effort made to artificially set trading
prices in the subject securities, would be contrary to those restrictions
on price manipulation imposed in the United States.
One lesson from the distribution process is well worth noting for
firms in the United States. As part of the offer and sale of the JAL
shares, major Japanese banks were placed on notice that they were
"expected" to purchase a specified portion of the new offering, presum-
ably as a condition of continued participation in the "credit-side" activ-
ities of one of the world's largest air transport companies. This practice
demonstrates the continued importance of banking relationships in Ja-
pan, in spite of the apparent growth of the equity markets. Banks "in-
vest" in their clients in a number of ways, and create strategic relation-
ships that encourage stronger and more active communication than
might be the case in the United States.
Fiscal Policies. As a general matter, the relationship between the
government's fiscal policy and trading activity in the capital markets is,
at best, indirect, except to the extent that offerings of government debt
securities "compete" for funds with private issuers. However, the sheer
size of the proposed offering of government-held securities, including
the NTT shares, as well as the government's need to fund various pub-
lic works projects and to meet its obligations to service the outstanding
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level of public debts, created a unique "public interest" in the market
activities of the shares of the former public corporations.
The proceeds from the sale of NTT shares, as well as the new
dividend and tax income, allowed the MOF to devote an extra 1.3 tril-
lion yen ($8.7 billion) a year to public works expenditures starting in
Fiscal Year 1988. 3  Even though the funds were not diverted to the
reduction of public debt, the offering of the NTT shares undoubtedly
eased some pressure in the money markets which may have been cre-
ated had the government needed to issue additional deficit reduction
bonds to fund the expansion of domestic demand. Similarly, the collec-
tion of "windfall" revenues influenced the debate on the imposition of
new taxes.
As noted above, the steep decline in NTT's share price, as well as
the general downturn of the Tokyo securities markets, has dampened
enthusiasm for future sales of NTT shares.380 Moreover, the stunning
lack of confidence in the government has crippled the MOF's strategy
of realizing further profits from the sale of shares of other former pub-
lic corporations, such as the JRG. These firms, although "privatized,"
are still owned and regulated by the government. This brief "failure"
of privatization may ultimately have a significant impact on the policies
of Japan's fiscal planners over the coming years, although the impact
will be difficult to measure. 81
Maturation ofJapanese Capital Markets. While it is true that the
NTT offering, as well as the other economic factors noted above, com-
bined to create the world's largest equity trading market and catapulted
Japanese securities firms to the forefront of global activities, it is alto-
gether unclear whether or not Japan's markets truly "matured" during
the process. Presumably, the new "public" firms, no longer able to de-
pend upon government financing, would create numerous underwriting
opportunities for domestic and foreign securities firms, including the
creation of new instruments that could be tailored to the specific needs
of firms operating in the telecommunications and transport industries.
An expectation might also be created that new capital market sec-
.79 JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE REPORT No. 26A at 8 (July, 1990).
380 Id.
381 It should not be forgotten that, with the exception of the JAL, the "privatized"
public corporations are still essentially wholly-owned affiliates of the Government and
are independently managed; the Government is, in theory, freed from any obligation to
continue direct operational funding of their operations. As such, given the essential
nature of certain of the services to be provided by these entities, it is conceivable that
the Government may be called upon to provide additional forms of financial assistance
to the firms, even if only by pressuring private banks and investors to provide new
operating funds when the firms are unable to tap the public securities markets.
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tors would evolve as firms move to exploit opportunities in the deregu-
lated industrial sectors, just as the "break-up" of AT&T in the United
States led to the development of new businesses, in various forms, fo-
cusing upon new technologies, products and services and market niches.
For example, in the telecommunications area, new Type I carriers
could presumably become candidates for public offerings in the future,
as might manufacturers and other firms, of various sizes, which are
engaged in providing products and services related to those delegated to
the larger firms. Already, Type II carriers which, by definition; are to
focus upon specific products and services in niche markets, are demon-
strating the scope of structural forms which might be utilized in the
environment of deregulated activities.
NTT Corporate Policies. One of the announced goals of privatiza-
tion for NTT and the other public corporations was to free manage-
ment from the burden of central government interference in key inter-
nal corporate policies. On the other hand, independence meant that the
corporations would need to forge their own financial strategies, build-
ing relationships with Japanese and foreign banks and investment firms
without the benefit of government guarantees. Also, dividend and tax
policies were to become important to NTT and the other corporations,
as would shareholder relations and the need to draw corporate policies
with an eye toward the disclosures which were anticipated from
broadly-held issuers.
For all of the foregoing, NTT's continuing domination of Type I
carrier services, as well as the massive cash flow which it enjoyed from
operations, has resulted in very little change in the manner in which
internal finances have been conducted at the firm. NTT is now free to
expand into new ventures, often in partnership with other large domes-
tic and foreign firms, and, at least until the recent scandals in the se-
curities markets, key NTT research and development and construction
projects were allocated throughout the country with an eye toward
LDP politics as much as anything else.
Government and the Capital Markets. We have already observed
the impact of government regulation on activities in the Japanese capi-
tal markets. However, the lessons of NTT go beyond the promulgation
and enforcement of laws directed at manipulative practices to the very
essence of the government's role, at least as perceived by elements of the
investment community, in insuring the value of funds committed to the
public corporations. The interests of government ministries and politi-
cians in the NTT share price, as well as in the regulatory environment
in which it operated, have been well chronicled. What now remains is
the challenge of restoring the confidence of domestic and foreign inves-
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tors in the capital markets process within Japan. While some have sug-
gested that the Japanese create new institutional supports, such as an
independent securities regulatory and review body, it is far more likely
that the "solution," if it comes, will recognize the unique network of
public and private finance that exists within Japan's own far-reaching
national industrial policy.
6.3. Conclusion
Privatization in Japan has not fared well in relation to orthodox
measures of its efficacy. First, while the NCC's have achieved some
degree of profitability and new entrants have overrun the Type II mar-
kets, NTT has retained its dominant market position. Second, while
significant private investment continues with respect to telecommunica-
tions activities, particularly among those large businesses in the
Keidenran who are financing the NCC's and new Type II operations,
the broader capital markets have yet to benefit from the growth of a
new telecommunications sector. Third, the new NTT has not led to the
development of the requisite independent managerial class; instead, for
the reasons cited, NTT operations remain a material function of the
MPT, MOF and the LDP. 82
If one were to return to this subject in a few years, it would be
interesting to see whether or not the deregulation of telecommunications
in Japan really operated to open new and diverse capital market op-
portunities. Would the main securities exchanges continue as mere
trading floors for imprudently priced securities, creating large commis-
sions for brokers, while companies obtained new capital from commer-
SI The proper balance between government intervention and private enterprise
with respect to telecommunications policy is by no means a settled issue. For his part,
Professor Harris urges Americans to recognize several valuable lessons from the appar-
ent reforms to Japanese telecommunications policy. First, telecommunications is a stra-
tegic industry vital to national economic and social welfare; as such, it is too important
to be left to courts or regulators. Harris, supra note 43, at 21. Instead, the national
legislature should assume a leadership role in developing a comprehensive national
policy for communications and information services. Id. Second, "[t]elecommunications
policy must balance dynamic, long-term goals in technologically advanced networks,
services and equipment industries with shorter run consumer protection interests.
[Third, p]olicy should be implemented primarily by a single agency with the incentive,
and the necessary tools, to implement policy in a logically coherent fashion." Id. at 21-
22. Finally, Harris praises the initial decision of the Japanese not to "make a forced
choice between "monopoly" and "competition" . . . [by] break[ing] up an integrated
supplier, or restrict[ing] its scope of operations, in order to promote competition." Id.
Harris advocates "open access and -interconnection, non-discrimination in rates and
conditions, and sharing of necessary technical standards and specifications" as an effec-
tive "intermediate" approach that combines the best of economies of scale and market
integration. Id.
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cial banking channels? Or would the size of NTT and the markets in
which it competes, as well as the technologies upon which the informa-
tion services markets depend, prove to be a true catalyst for reformed
markets in which companies could look for new equity capital and in-
vestors? Could employees share in the growth and profitability associ-
ated with the performance of the firm? Only time, and the memories of
those whose funds may have been dedicated to the original "NTT mir-
acle," hold the answer.
Date of Change Current Main Remaining
Enterprise Of Status Ownership Regulations
Nippon April 1985 3,900,000 More than one-
Telegraph and shares sold to third of total
Telephone Japanese share to
public during remain in
1986/1987 and government
control.
Permits
control of
bylaws. Fares
subject to
approval of
Ministry of
Post and
Telecommunica-
tion.
Obligation of
uniform
service.
Japan April 1987 100 per cent Approval of
National JNR Settlement Ministry for
Railways Corporation fare changes
stock to be
sold to
public: date
not yet set.
Japan Air November 1987 100 per cent Controls on
Lines private fares and
routes
Japan Tobacco April 1985 100 per cent Retains
Inc. government monopoly of
One-third of tobacco
shares to be production,
sold to and
public at a monopolistic
date not yet sales of salt
set
Sources: OECD Japan 1987188 at p. 82.
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